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The Consumer Interest in Corporate
Law
David G. Yosifon*
This Article provides a comprehensive assessment of the consumer
interest in dominant theories of the corporation and in the fundamental
doctrines of corporate law. In so doing, the Article fills a void in
contemporary corporate law scholarship, which has failed to give
sustained attention to consumers in favor of exploring the interests of
other corporate stakeholders, especially shareholders, creditors, and
workers. Utilizing insights derived from the law and behavioralism
movement, this Article examines, in particular, the limitations of the
shareholder primacy norm at the heart of prevailing "nexus of contracts"
and "team production" theories of the firm. The Article concludes that
fundamental reforms in corporate governance may be needed in order to
vindicate the consumer interest in corporate enterprise.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporations exist to serve a sOcially useful purpose . l Successful
corporations provide shareholders with profits, employees with jobs,
and consumers with products. Although each of these groups has a
stake in the successful operation of the firm, the law makes corporate
directors fiduciaries of shareholders only. Dominant theories of
corporate law insist upon the social utility of this shareholder primacy
norm in corporate governance. Indeed, most corporate law scholarship
focuses on how corporate law can best implement this basic principle.
In the shadows of shareholder primacy, critical corporate law scholars
have developed robust critiques of the dominant regime. These
critiques typically focus on the ways in which shareholder primacy
fails to vindicate employee interests in corporate undertakings. With
mainstream analysis focused on shareholders, and critical work
devoted to workers, the consumer interest has been left relatively
unexamined in corporate law scholarship.
This Article endeavors first to explain the absence of sustained
attention to the consumer interest in corporate law, and then seeks to
begin filling in that gap with an analysis suggesting that fundamental
reforms in corporate governance may be needed to vindicate the
consumer interest in corporate enterprise. Part I explains why
corporations should be made to serve the interests of society generally,
and explores conventional justifications for how contemporary
corporate law is thought to advance consumer interests.2 Part II
explicates the ways in which corporate law fails this task. Subpart A
critiques the dominant view of the consumer interest in corporate law
through an analytic framework informed by insights from the law and
behavioralism movement.3 Subpart B examines three consumer
markets where the failure of corporate law in connection with
consumers can readily be seen - markets in cigarettes, food, and
dietary supplements.4 Subpart C specifies that the problems in these
markets are failures of corporate law in particular, and not simply
market exchange or capitalism generally. 5 Although most of Part II
focuses on ways in which corporate law fails individual consumers,
subpart D emphaSizes that corporate law also presently fails to provide

I

See infra Part LA.
See infra Part L
3 See infra Part II.A.
i See infra Part II.B. 1 -3.
5 See infra Part II.C.
2
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consumers a mechanism to overcome collective action problems
inhibiting socially responsible consumption patterns.6 Finally, Part III
explores potential corporate law solutions to these problems.7 Subpart
A analyzes the merits of providing corporate directors greater latitude
to attend to consumer interests.8 Subpart B first examines the
possibility of expanding the fiduciary obligations of corporate
directors to require them to attend to the consumer interest, and then
considers the plausibility of involving consumers in the election of
corporate directors.9 Part III c oncludes by exploring the viability of
allowing consumers to propose and vote on specific proposals for the
reform of corporate policies, a privilege that the federal securities laws
presently provide to shareholders. 10
I.

THE C ONSUMER INTEREST AT THE END OF HISTORY FOR
CORPORATE LAw

A.

The Purpose of Corporate Law

Large, publicly traded corporations take their present powerful form
because of concessions bestowed on them by the state. These
concessions include limited liability for corporate shareholders, and
the rights of firms to enter into contracts and buy, hold, and sell
property as independent entities. II The state can legitimately grant
these concessions only if it does so to advance a public purpose. 1 2
This "concession" theory of the corporation easily explains why
corporations should be constructed and regulated in a way that
advances the public interest generally. But the concession model is
passe in contemporary corporate theory. Leading theorists today
purport to look past the fiction of the firm as an independent entity
created by the state, and instead see the corporation as a series of
intersecting, voluntary arrangements - a "nexus of contracts" 6

See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part III.
S See infra Part lILA.
9 See infra Part III.B.I-2.
10 See
infra Part III.e.
II
See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 20 1 , 205-1 1 ( 1990)
(discussing this concession theory of corporation). See generally Paul G. Mahoney,
Contract or Concession?: An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873
( 2000) (examining "concession" theory of firm). This Article is primarily concerned
with theoretical and policy issues relating to large, publicly traded corporations
operating on a regional, national, or international scale.
12
See Millon, supra note 1 1 , at 205-07; supra note 1 1 and accompanying text.
7
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formed by parties to corporate dealings. 13 These parties include
shareholders, creditors, directors, workers, and consumers. 14 Under
the nexus of contracts theory, corporate law does not create any
entity, but rather serves only to supply efficient terms to the contracts
that the various stakeholders in the corporate nexus would agree to if
they went to the trouble and cost of actually negotiating them. 1 5 This
nexus of contracts approach to the corporation, however, must
ultimately advance under the same banner of social purpose as does
the concession theory.
Corporate law scholars recognize that contracting regimes include
pervasive state involvement that can only be justified by a social
purpose. 16 This pervasiveness is well evidenced in the corporate arena
by the extensive public institutions employed in advancing corporate
operations, such as regulation of the securities markets. But at the
most fundamental level, pervasive state involvement must be seen in
the state's willingness and ability to enforce contracts, including those
that comprise the corporate nexus.17 Recognizing this inevitable

13 See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &: DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw (1996) (elaborating nexus of contracts approach to
corporate law) ; Stephen A. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNEll L REV.
856, 859 (1997) (" ' [ C ] ontractarians' model the firm not as a single entity, but as an
aggregate of various inputs . . . . Employees provide labor. Creditors provide debt
capital. Shareholders provide equity capital, bear the risk of losses, and monitor the
performance of management.").
14 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
15 See EASTERBROOK &: FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 15 ("The normative thesis [of
nexus of contracts theory] is that corporate law should contain the terms people
would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm's length for every
contingency suffiCiently low. The positive thesis is that corporate law almost always
conforms to this model."). The contractarian view is especially celebrated in
contemporary legal scholarship, but the nexus of contracts conception of the firm has
long been a part of the literature. See, e.g., Merrick Dodd, Note, For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L REV. 1 145, 1 145-46 (1932) (describing
contractarian view as "widely prevalent theory") .
1 6 See infra note 1 7 and accompanying text.
17 This crucial inSight - the "private market . . . [as] an artifact of 'public
violence,' " - is easily forgotten or ignored in discussions of contract generally, and
the nexus of contracts theory of the corporation in particular. Perhaps that is because
the inSight is treated as abstract, and thus wanes in our thinking for want of salience.
See William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal,
74 CORNEll L REV. 407, 438-39 ( 1 989) . The conceptual can be made salient, and in
its salience be afforded an attention commensurate with its importance, through
storytelling. Cj. Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination: The Role of Narrative in Corporate
Law, 55 BUFF. L REV. 537 (2007) (lamenting limited use of storytelling in corporate
law). There is a scene in Michael Moore's ROGER AND ME ( 1989) in which Moore,
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statism in corporate law, leading corporate scholars Henry Hansmann
and Reinier Kraakman assert that "all thoughtful people believe that
corporate enterprise should be organized and operated to serve the
interests of society as a whole, and that the interests of shareholders
deserve no greater weight in this social calculus than do the interests
of any other member of society." 18 The social purpose principle thus
must drive the analysis of corporate law irrespective of the theory of
the firm with which one begins . 19

B.

Shareholder Primacy and the Consumer Interest

The consensus regarding the core social purpose of corporate law is
sometimes obscured by the seemingly contradictory doctrinal
prescription that nexus of contracts theorists also universally reach that corporate law should require firm managers to pursue maximum
profits for shareholders. 20 Nexus of contract theorists insist that there
is no contradiction afoot because shareholder primacy is the corporate
governance principle that serves all stakeholder interests better than
a ny other rule. 2 1 These theorists argue that shareholder primacy is

depicting the consequences of General Motors' massive, swift downsizing in the 1980s
on the people of Flint, Michigan, follows a curly-mustached, not unamiable, middle
aged constable around the neighborhoods of Flint. He raps on poor people's doors and
announces, "I'm here to put you out," whereupon he moves typically women, their
children, and their belongings to the sidewalk and locks them out of what is now no
longer their home for failure to pay rent. Id. The central part played by affirmative law
and state power in basic contract and property law, no less than in corporate law, can
very clearly be seen after viewing these scenes.
18 Henry Hansmann &: Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J . 439, 441 (200 1). This is also a longstanding trope in corporate law
scholarship. See, e.g. , Dodd, supra note 15, at 1 149 (" [BJ usiness is permitted and
encouraged by the law primarily because it is of service to the community rather than
because it is a source of profit to its owners.").
19
See Hansmann &: Kraakman, supra note 18, at 44 1 n.5 ("The traditional debate
between concession and contract theorists is simply confused . . . . Corporations whether 'concessions' or contracts - should be regulated when it is in the public
interest to do so. ").
20
See id. at 439 ("There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value."); see
also EASTERBROOK &: FISCHEL , supra note 13, at 35-39. As will be examined infra text
accompanying notes 137-6 1 , there is considerable debate among corporate scholars as
to whether positive law does indeed presently reflect this norm of shareholder
primacy, but the view that it should be the dominant rule is ensconced in prevailing
corporate theory.
21
See Hansmann &: Kraakman, supra note 18, at 441 n.5 ("[TJhe standard model
is, in effect, an assertion that social welfare is best served by encouraging corporate
managers to pursue shareholder interests.").
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therefore the principle that all stakeholders in the corporate nexus
would agree to if they actually negotiated terms.
Nexus of contracts theorists rely on a host of interrelated arguments
that purport to demonstrate the social utility of shareholder primacy
in corporate governance. First among these is the claim that the
interests of all corporate stakeholders (investors, workers, and
consumers, among others) are closely aligned. The corporation's
promise to pursue profits for their shareholders gives shareholders the
incentive to invest their capital in corporate enterprise. Such capital
pooling generates economies of scale, which creates jobs, thus making
workers better off. Large-scale collaborations of capital and labor can
produce better and cheaper goods and services, which benefits
consumers. Therefore , "maximizing profits for equity investors assists
,,
the other 'constituencies' automatically. 22
Firm governance on behalf of passive shareholders, the dominant
theory holds, is also necessary to counterbalance advantages enjoyed by
other stakeholders. Workers, for example, are physically present on the
corporate shop floor, and thus can protect their interests in the
corporate enterprise through specifically negotiated terms of
employment and compensation.23 Similarly, consumers' presence at the
cash register makes contract a viable mechanism through which they
can monitor and negotiate their stake in their corporate undertakings.
Nexus of contract theorists contend that even though in most markets
workers and consumers do not actually negotiate terms with firm
managers, these corporate stakeholders indirectly bargain through their
acceptance or rejection of employment or goods at the offered price. As
bellwether nexus of contract theorists Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel explain: "Entrepreneurs or managers may adopt a set of rules
and say, 'take them or leave them.' This is contracting . . . . The terms

22 EASTERBROOK ESt FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 38.
23 ld. at 24. The gains to trade from corporate enterprise can be:

[Dlivided by decision or default among four broad groups of claimants: (1)
the managers - in salary increments, bonuses, perquisites, and fringe
benefits; (2) the stockholders - directly by way of higher dividends or
indirectly by way of internal investment and capital gains; (3) the workers
and suppliers of productive inputs . . . in higher than competitive wages and
other higher input prices; and (4) the consumers of the product - in lower
output prices and/or higher quality.
Martin Bronfenbrenner, The Consumer, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS
PREDICAMENT 169, 173 Games W. Mckie ed., 1974).
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in rental contracts, warranties, and the like are real contracts because
their value (or detriment) is reflected in price."H
As long as corporations operate in competitive markets, corporate
managers must offer wages and prices that are favorable to their
nonshareholding stakeholders lest these constituencies take their
business elsewhere.25 Where monopolies or disparities in bargaining
power make this kind of contracting insufficient to protect the
interests of workers or consumers, nexus of contract theorists argue
that the interests of these nonshareholding stakeholders should be
protected by external regulation, such as labor laws and consumer
protection statutes. Overall social utility, shareholder primacists insist,
is best accomplished by unbowed adherence to the principle of
shareholder primacy in firm governance within the regulatory
environments that such laws p rovide.26 Nexus of contract theorists
also prescribe collateral regulatory regimes to contain the shareholder
primacy corporation's tendency to externalize its costs to the general
public with whom it has no contractual relationship at all, such as
through pollution or waste of natural resources. 27
The dominance of the nexus of contracts, shareholder primacy
model of the corporation "among the academic, business, and
governmental elites in leading j urisdictions" is well proclaimed by the
title of Hansmann and Kraakman's prominent apologia for the
approach, The End of History for Corporate Law. 28 The prevailing view
is that corporate law is complete - the shareholder primacy norm
provides the best of all possible worlds of corporate governance. The
global economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 will perhaps usher in an era
of doubt regarding conventional corporate theory. If it does, this
Article's arguments may find a more sympathetic audience than
initially anticipated. Nevertheless, while the Obama Administration
was ushered in with appetite all around for "more regulation" in the
financial markets, there is little in presently contemplated

24 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 16-17.
25 Id. at 22-25.
26
See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 442 (indicating that external
regulation is called for where contract is insufficient to protect nonshareholder
interests).
27 See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the
Corporate Objective Function, 7 EUR. FIN. MGMT . 297, 309 (200l) ( " [ Rlesolving
externality and monopoly problems . . . is the legitimate domain of the government in
its rule-setting function."); see also Ron Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The
Legitimating Schemas of Modem Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1 , 33-42
( 2004) (elaborating this "macro-script" of corporate policy).
28 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 440.
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administrative or congressional response to the crisis that is motivated
by or would effectuate a repudiation of shareholder primacy in
corporate governance.
II.

C RITIQUING THE C ONSUMER INTEREST IN C ORPORATE THEORY

A.

The Problem of Common Sense in Corporate Theory

Two hundred years' worth of work in economics and finance
indicates that social welfare is maximized when all firms in an
economy maximize total firm value. The intuition behind this
criterion is simply that (social) value is created - when I say
"value" I mean "social" value - whenever a firm produces an
output, or set of outputs, that is valued by its customers at
more than the value of the inputs it consumes . . . in the
production of the outputS.29
- Michael C. Jensen
Nexus of contract scholars typically list consumers among the
parties in the corporate nexus, but they do not typically give sustained
attention to how the model vindicates consumer interests.3o The
standard account of shareholder primacy presumes that the profit
motive forces firms in competitive markets to discern and satisfy
consumer preferences in order to remain profitable. The view that
consumer choices in competitive markets reflect consumers' private
preferences is the bedrock "intuition" that Jensen, in the quote above,
argues authorizes two-hundred years worth of economic analysis on
how firms maximize social utility.3l This intuition animates the basic
rational actor conception of the human beings who engage in the
contracting that the nexus of contracts theory describes.32 Rational
29 Jensen, supra note 27, at 302 (emphasis added).
30 See, e.g. , Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 877 (listing consumers among parties to
corporate nexus, but not examining consumer interest in detail) .
31 See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also EASTERBROOK &: FISCHEL,
supra note 13, at 4 ("[Firms] must attract customers and investors by promising and
delivering what those people value. Corporations that do not do so will not survive.
When people observe that firms are very large . . . they observe the product of success
in satisfying investors and customers."); id. at 38 ( A successful firm provides . . .
goods and services for consumers. The more appealing the goods to consumers, the
more profit . . . . ").
3 2 Jon Hanson &: David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist
Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO . L.j. 1, 8-15, 138-52 (2004) [ hereinafter The
Situational Character) (demonstrating dominance of rational actor model in contract
"
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actors are presumed, either explicitly or implicitly, to have within
them a set of privately ordered preferences for goods and services,
among other interests and desires.33 As rational actors, consumers
gather and evaluate appropriate amounts o f information regarding
options available to them in the market in order to maximize their
preference satisfaction through their consumption, which reveals
those preferences.
The prominence of the rational actor model within contemporary
legal scholarship is bolstered by its consonance with intuitive,
common sense ways of thinking about human decision-making and
behavior.34 As social psychologists demonstrate, and as most people's
personal experience will attest, human beings tend to view their own
choices and behavior as arising from the intersection of their
conscious thinking about personal preferences and the exercise of
their will.35 We cannot see inside the hearts or heads of other people,
but when we see their choices or actions, we tend to assume that their
conduct is driven by the same causal schema that we see within
ourselves. We thus tend to draw conclusions about other people's
thoughts, preferences, and will, based on their choices and conduct.36
The rational actor model, generally, and the revealed preference theory
of consumer behavior, in particular, reflect these intuitions.
Revealed preference theory does a lot of work in the standard
account of corporate law. With it in place, the consumer becomes the
most crucial protagonist in the nexus of contracts saga, and, indeed,
the entire social system of which it is a part:
The consumer is and should be sovereign in allocating an
economy's resources - ultimately determining by his [or her]
choices in free markets what should be produced and in what
quantities, by what methods it should be produced, how not
only consumer goods but also other goods should be evaluated
[e.g. , raw materials] . This amounts to indirectly deciding the

law); see also KENT G REENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAw 171-72, 217-24 (2007)
(analyzing role of rational actor in corporate law). See generally Chen & Hanson, supra
note 27 (describing role of rational actor in "meta-scripts" of corporate theory) .
33 See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 32, at 6-8, 144-52.
34 See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 1 29 (2003) [ hereinafter The Situation] (developing this argument).
35 See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 32
(reviewing studies establishing ubiquity of these causal schemas in human thinking) .
36 See id. at 5-8, 22-34.
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distribution of income and wealth and the social provision for
growth and change.37
As familiar as this causal schema is , it is always incomplete, and
often misleading.38 Social psychologists describe the framework as "lay
dispositionism" because it focuses predominately on the role of
individual disposition in accounting for human behavior, to the
exclusion of fully appreciating the ubiquity and power of unseen
situational influences over human conduct.39 Such situational
influences include features of our internal lives, such as cognitive
heuristics and biases, motivations, and visceral dynamics, which
function within us in ways which are usually opaque to our conscious
awareness, but which nevertheless profoundly shape the limited
features of our self-schema that we do see (such as conscious thoughts
and Will) . 40 Situational influences, as social psychologists use the term,
also consist of external features of the world around us, including
social and environmental contexts, which profoundly influence
human behavior, but often remain unseen in our conscious evaluation
37 Bronfenbrenner, supra note 23, at 1 72; see Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee,
Nonshareholders and Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18
DEL. ] . CORP. L. 393, 4 1 7-18 ( 1993) (" [S] ociety is the real principal of business
decisions, since the primary objective of all economic activity is to serve the interests
of consumers . . . . An evolutionary process prevails in which those firms that organize
in ways that best facilitate the cooperation of owners, managers, and workers for the
purpose of creating consumer value have the best long-run prospects for survival.").
Sometimes the consumer interest is considered co-extensive with the social interest
because, as Henry Simons put it, " [ 0] ne gets the right answers usually by regarding
simply the interests of consumers, since we are all consumers . . . . " HENRY C. SIMONS,
ECONOMIC POliCY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 123 (1948). Shareholder primacists sometimes
make a similar analytic move and argue that there is no problem in privileging
shareholder interests in corporate governance given that, as a result of equity holdings
in retirement plans, investments in mutual funds, etc., we are all shareholders now.
See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 451-53 (making this argument) .
This is, again, a longstanding trope in corporate scholarship. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr. ,
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367-68
(1932) (arguing that "not less than half the population of the country" had a direct
equity interest in publicly traded corporations). But see GREENFIELD, supra note 32, at
156 (arguing that in fact we are not all shareholders, as wealthiest 20 percent of
Americans own 90 percent of stocks).
38 See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 32
(reviewing divergence between intuitive and social scientific conceptions of human
behavior).
39 See LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 139-43
( 1991) . See generally Chi-yue Chiu et al. , Lay Dispositionism and Implicit Theories of
Personality, 73]. PERSONAliTY & So c . PSYCHOL. 19 ( 1997) (explicating concept of lay
dispositionism) .
4() See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 32, at 5-8, 22-33.
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of our own and other people's conduct.41 This dispositionism carries
over from our intuitions and informs our legal theories and the law,
which, in many areas, emphasizes or assumes the importance of
private, internal sources of individual behavior, while unduly
discounting its situational sources.42 Conventional corporate theory, in
particular, embraces this dispositionism in its conception of consumer
behavior, which under the dominant view is presumed more or less
e xclusively to reveal privately ordered preferences, rather than to
reflect situational influences in any meaningful way.
Instead of the intuition-driven rational actor model, corporate law
scholars might instead deploy a social-science based "situational
character" approach to human behavior. 43 This approach strives to
highlight and grapple with the myriad of situational influences on
conduct that human beings tend to miss unaided by social science,
while simultaneously restraining the authority of unreliable,
dispositionist intuitions in our assessment of the sources of behavior.44
An example of an insight from the heuristics and biases literature
that has already received significant attention in legal scholarship
through the influence of the law and behavioralism movement is the
" availability heuristic. "45 The availability heuristic denotes the
widespread human tendency to make p robability assessments based
on the ease with which instances of a circumstance automatically
come to mind, rather than through anything like a formal actuarial
analysis of relevant data.46 Heuristic thinking is a necessary part of
human existence, as both our brains and our time on earth are

41 Social psychologists, and legal scholars making use of them, sometimes refer to
the problem of dispositionism as the "fundamental attribution error." See Hanson &
Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 34, at 1 49-79.
42 See id. at 285-303; see also Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra
note 32, at 8- 1S.
43 See generally Hanson & Yosifon , The Situational Character, supra note 32
(developing situational character approach to human behavior for use in legal
analysis).
44 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (summarizing studies and their
implications for legal analysis). See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
630 (1999) [ hereinafter TBS 1] (reviewing studies and analyzing implications of social
psychology for tort law); Christine Jolls et aI. , A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (summarizing studies).
45 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note 44, at 662 (discussing availability
heuristic). In addition to availability, other prominent heuristics and biases that have
made their way into legal academic discourse include framing effects, anchoring
effects, hindsight bias, and confirmatory bias, among others. See id.
46 See id. at 662 (discussing availability heuristic).
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limited.47 Cognitive shortcuts often serve us well, as when we
accurately assess that a car careening towards us will harm us if we do
not move away from it, drawing not on elaborate deductions from
formal rules of physics, but from easily recalled instances of
automobile accidents. As useful as heuristics are, they also can be
misleading, for example, when in the wake of a statistically rare but
exceptionally vivid airplane crash, one mistakenly concludes that air
travel is more dangerous than car travel, which actually carries far
greater risk. Perhaps the most crucial insight for legal theory that
emerges from the heuristics and biases literature - as well as the law
and behavioralism movement generally - is the recognition that
heuristics and other cognitive processes on which humans
unknowingly rely in making decisions are highly susceptible to
unseen influences through the manipulation of our decision-making
environments. That this is true has been well documented in the
literally thousands of laboratory studies discerning, tracking ,
tweaking, and testing the contours of the myriad cognitive
mechanisms that shape human thinking and behavior.48
Beyond the heuristics and biases literature, many other insights
from the social sciences are relevant to developing a realistic
conception of human behavior for use in corporate theory. Studies
concerning the function of motivations and motivated reasoning, for
example, are also highly relevant. Human beings are powerfully,
though usually unconsciously, motivated to view themselves, the
groups with which they associate, and even the social system in which

47 See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 32, at 22-25.
48 To give just one example, consider the follo\Ving study from Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman's seminal paper on the availability heuristic. Tversky and
Kahneman exposed subjects to a recording of a list of names. One variant of the study
included nineteen female names, including some famous names (e.g., Elizabeth
Taylor) , and twenty male names, none of which were famous. In another variant, the
recording consisted of nineteen male names, some of which were famous (e.g. ,
Richard Nixon), and twenty female names, none of which were famous. After listening
to the recording subjects were asked to assess whether there were more female or male
names in the list they had heard. The research concluded that " [almong the 99
subjects who compared the frequency of men and women in the lists, 80 erroneously
judged the class consisting of the more famous names to be more frequent." Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 220-21 (1973). By manipulating the salience of
the names in their lists, Tverskey and Kahneman were able to predictably manipulate
the accuracy of their subjects' assessments of the lists. Id.; see also Hanson & Kysar,
TBS I, supra note 44, at 643-87; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra
note 32, at 39-41; infra Section l I.B (providing examples of manipulation of processes
involved in consumer risk perception in retail markets).
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they live, in a positive and affirming fashion.49 These motivations
p rovide us with confidence and faith in our own capabilities, which
serve us well in navigating life's challenges. They can mislead us in
particular contexts, however, and such motivations are, like unseen
cognitive processes, subj ect to manipulation in ways that are difficult
to consciously anticipate or appreciate. 50 In addition to motivation
studies, other important insights into human thinking and behavior
emerge from the study of "basal" human drives such as the eating and
sexual systems. These drives influence human behavior in ways that
either are not appraised or are affirmatively misconstrued in our
intuitive self-conceptions, and thus are far more vulnerable to
manipulation than our intuitions lead us to appreciate. 5 1
This social science literature undermines the reliability of the
revealed preference assumption that lies at the heart of conventional
corporate theory's conception of consumer behavior.52 Indeed,
inserting the situational character into the dominant corporate law
paradigm yields a troubling conj ecture. If corporate law is structured
to require and enable firms to maximize shareholder value, then
corporations will have the incentive and ability to discern and make
use of many of the same heuristics, motivations, and visceral drives
that social psychologists have tracked, but which lay people
themselves tend not to see. By exercising control over external
situations, corporations can manipulate the formation and
manifestation of preferences, thoughts, and will in ways difficult for
consumers and regulators, guided by dispositionist schemas, to
track. 53 The pressures of competitive markets will require profit
seeking firms to engage in such conduct, or else firms willing to do so
will subsume them. Indeed, those firms that unintentionally conform
to such business practices, even by accident, will prevail over firms
that fail to do so through the "evolutionary process" of market
competition. 54 This problem of " power economics" takes many forms,
but most palpably, it can be witnessed in the manipulation of

49

See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 32, at 90- 1 14.
See id. ; see also infra Part \l.B (discussing manipulation of often-unseen
motivations in retail consumer markets).
5 1 See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (discussing human eating system).
52 See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
53 See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 34, at 230-84.
54 See supra note 37 (quoting Debow & Lee on "evolutionary process" of firm
practice engendered by market competition) .
50
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consumer risk perceptions regarding the health or other effects of
consuming particular goods or services.55
With a framework in place that anticipates the problem of market
manipulation, efforts to achieve such manipulation are perceptible in
many markets. 56 That such efforts are widespread in the business
practices of firms in retail markets is indeed an open secret. Law and
behavioralism allows scholars and researchers to make explicit in
corporate theory what is already obvious in corporate practice. One
leading market research firm, for example, recently published a freely
available paper on the Social Science Research Network, co-authored
by Harvey H. Hartman and a team of six Ph.D.s, which takes it as a
given that
[ T l he ultimate goal of consumer research, of course, is to sell
products and services - to determine what consumers want
and/or to convince them they want what is or can be
produced. When we say we want to understand consumers
better, it is with the intention of influencing them or otherwise
taking advantage of the opportunities that such understanding
reveals.57
If consumer preferences and deciSion-making are in Significant ways
susceptible to unseen but potent influence or manipulation by other
actors within the market, then the reliability of both the consumer
sovereignty assumption, and the shareholder primacy norm in
corporate governance that it supports, are cast into doubt.
To be sure, the dominant corporate law framework does anticipate
some circumstances where externalities, monopolies, or information
asymmetries between the consumer and the firm frustrates the
maximization of social u tility generally, and the satisfaction of
consumer preferences in particular. As noted above , in such
circumstances the "end of history" approach urges continued
adherence to shareholder primacy in corporate governance, claiming
that external regulatory institutions, such as environmental, antitrust,
and consumer protection regimes, should manage such market

See Hanson &: Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 34, at 193-202.
See infra Part II.B.
57 Harvey H. Hartman et al., Extending Shopper Insights: Understanding Cultural
DynamiCS 4 (The Hartman Group Working Paper, 2005), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract= 758546. The rest of their article goes on to describe an elaborate social
scientific framework that the Hartman Group uses to study how "cultural dynamics"
can be harnessed to influence consumer behavior. ld.
55
56
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failures.58 However, as Dan Kahan has recently reminded us, "ought
implies can."59 In an effort to maximize shareholder wealth,
powerfully efficient corporations work to undermine the performance
of the same external regulatory institutions that the dominant

58 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. Indeed, one might track the rise
of several significant governmental b ureaucracies, including the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, and the expansion of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
into consumer protection concerns, concomitant to the strengthening of shareholder
interests in corporate governance through expansion of the federal securities laws. See
David Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture: The Commercial Speech Doctrine and Junk-Food
Advertising to Children, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 507, 535-36 (2006) [hereinafter Resisting
Deep Capture] (describing historical development of FTC j urisdiction); see also Adam
Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of B usiness ?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance
at the End of History, 67 LAw & CONTEMP . PROBS. 109, 1 13-15 ( 2004) (discussing
historical development of institutions for nonshareholding stakeholders in
corporation) . Shareholder primacists emphasize the ubiquitous pressures that
collateral law places on corporate decision-making. See, e.g. , id. at 1 28:

Despite the common conception of corporate governance as pertaining to
shareholder-management relations, the actual decisionmaking of corporate
officers is heavily constrained by legal rules from outside of corporate law.
One must take into account environmental law, labor law, civil rights law,
workplace safety law, and pension law, lest one be left with a distorted and
incomplete view of how the law actually shapes those corporate decision
matrices. Basic b usiness decisions - whom to hire, which products to
produce, how to produce, how to market, and how to structure firm finances
- are all profoundly affected by the law of business, over and above the
demands of corporate law or the capital markets.
The regulatory gauntlet may be elaborate, but corporations do run it successfully. The
regulatory infrastructure may be vast, but it is the shareholder primacy norm that
stands "over and above" other stakeholders interests at the end of it. Further, although
it is true that there are collateral institutions for other stakeholders, there are also
collateral institutions for shareholders in addition to shareholder primacy in corporate
law itself, including federal securities regulation, as well as the FTC, which protects
not just consumer interests, but also the rights of corporations to fair competition. See
generally Sidney M. Milkis, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection:
Regulatory Change and Administrative Pragmatism, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 9 1 1 (2005)
(summarizing history of FTC's regulation of unfair trade practices) .
59 Dan Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1 15, 154 (2008) .
Kahan argues that the "norm of public reason" traditionally advocated by liberal
political theorists - in which political discourse must be framed in terms that appeal
to objective, overlapping consensus values, rather than subjective, private, or
community-based world-views - is impossible as a cognitive matter. Kahan develops
his previously articulated conception of "discursive overdeterminism" as an
alternative norm of discourse appropriate to the needs of pluralistic, democratic
societies. See David G. YoSifon, Legal Theoretic Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic
Analysis, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 681 , 724-33 ( 2008) [ hereinafter Legal Theoretic
Inadequacy] (critiquing Kahan) .
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paradigm purports to rely on to contain corporate exploitation of
nonshareholder interests.6o Where manipulation is profitable ,
consumers and corporations compete for regulation to allow or
restrain it. Corporations, by virtue of their smaller numbers , singular
interest , and wealth , are better positioned to succeed in this
competition than are consumers, who are scattered , have multiple
overlapping interests, and cannot pool their resources and energies
effectively to pursue regulatory intervention. This "public choice"
problem is a corporate law problem, and an unanswered challenge to
the shareholder primacy paradigm.6 1
Moreover, just as profit-maximizing corporations strive to "capture"
formal regulation, they also aggreSSively promote to regulators and
consumers a view of consumer behavior that reflects the dispositionist
framework that humans are already psychologically primed to see.
This view of consumer behavior helps firms evade legal or moral
responsibility for the consequences of consumer dealings with them.
To the extent that consumers view their own behavior through a
dispositionist framework , and miss the situational influences that
firms exercise over them, consumers will not recognize a need to
develop and call upon regulatory institutions for protection. This is
the problem of " deep capture."62
Corporate law scholars are traditionally resistant to any
formalization of the market manipulation problem. As one economist
put it, "It is always admitted in the abstract that any consumer's tastes
and choices are determined largely by his [or her] social milieu and
can therefore be affected by producer devices such as advertising and
salesmanship. In practice, however , producer influence on demand
and utility is downgraded by utility economists as ephemeral. "63
Indeed, in prominent corporate law scholarship , the reliability of
revealed preference theory is taken for granted , resting as it does on
uncontroverted common sense. The reliability of revealed preference

60

See, e.g. , infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
See FRED s. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION,
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 9- 1 7 (1997) (synthesizing and extending modem work on
capture theory) ; Hanson &: Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 34, at 202-06
(discussing capture literature); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL]. ECON. &: MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (explicating fundamentals of capture theory) .
62
See generally Hanson &: Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 34, at 206-30
(explicating problem of deep capture) .
63 Bronfenbrenner, supra note 23, at 1 72. See generally Yosifon, Legal Theoretic
Inadequacy, supra note 59 (analyzing failure of emerging behavioral law and
economics scholarship to address problem of market manipulation) .
61
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theory is so self-evident that Easterbrook and Fischel conclude that
anyone who doubts it must be engaged in motivated reasoning:
The critic who says that some important term of corporate
governance has escaped this mechanism [ competitive pricing)
is saying either that the costs and benefits are not knowable or
that he [or she) alone knows the costs and benefits . . . . The
more likely hypothesis, however, is that the people who are
backing their beliefs with cash are correct; they have every
reason to avoid mistakes, while critics (be they academics or
regulators) are rewarded for novel rather than accurate
beliefs. 64
Easterbrook and Fischel view the problem of motivated reasoning as
important to understanding academic behavior, but are certain that
consumer behavior can be explained by nothing other than "correct"
figuring of costs and benefits in consumption decisions. Other than
their intuitions about the sources of human behavior, nothing in this
conclusory assertion, or in their analysis generally, explains why this
is " the more likely hypothesis."

B.

Failing the Consumer Interest in Corporate Law: Examples

Theoretical failure begets empirical suffering. This subpart briefly
explores the problem of market manipulation in three retail consumer
markets - cigarettes, food , and dietary supplements. This examination
is not proffered as hypothesis testing. Rather, it is meant to vivify, by
use of real world illustrations, the theoretical critique of the dominant
corporate law paradigm developed in subpart A. Feminist legal
scholars, who have recognized that diverse discursive strategies are

64 EASTERBROOK &: FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 3l. Easterbrook and Fischel's
discourse here perhaps reflects what social psychologists have labeled "naive realism"
- the h uman tendency to believe that our own thinking is objective and rational
while other people's thinking is biased and motivated. In fact, we are usually right
about others but wrong about ourselves. See Hanson &: Yosifon, The Situational
Character, supra note 32, at 94-100. Obviously, in suggesting that the standard-bearers
of conventional corporate theory are misled in their assessment of their theory
because of their dispositionist bias, I have myself satisfied at least one prong in the
expected pattern. Although my arguments and conclusions are no doubt more
motivated than I a ppreciate in formulating them, I nevertheless endeavor to restrain
the distorting effects of such unseen impulses by explicitly employing a social
scientific framework dedicated to the containment of falsified intuition. I am also
cognizant of the fact that the reception of these arguments by the reader is no simple
function of the cogency of my claims, but will depend heavily on the reader's
precommitments.
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essential to exposing realities that would otherwise remain unseen
under narrow analytic techniques, promote this methodology.65 One
might argue that the examples described below are highly selective and
not generally representative of consumer markets. A sampling of
consumer markets might just as easily include vignettes describing
advances in pharmaceuticals and their amelioration of human misery,
or illustrations of the unmitigated delights of consumer electronics, all
enabled by the shareholder primacy norm. This Article, however, is not
intended to offer a typical or even an average account. Instead, it aims
to highlight a kind of problem - the manipulation of consumers that predictably and demonstrably emerges through our corporate law,
and demands remedy.
l.

Tobacco

The retail market for cigarettes provides a trenchant example of the
kind of exploitation of consumers that conventional corporate law
enables. Smoking-related illnesses - including numerous forms of
cancer, emphysema, and heart disease - are the leading cause of
preventable death in the United States, with more than 435 ,000
consumers killed each year.66
Cigarettes are one of the most heavily promoted consumer goods in
human history.67 Throughout the 20th century, corporations involved
in the manufacture and sale of cigarettes undertook monumental
efforts to upend or mitigate consumer concerns about the health
consequences of smoking.68 In a path-breaking series of articles, Jon
Hanson and Douglas Kysar examined the ways in which the tobacco
industry systematically exploited heuristics and biases in human
cognition to reduce consumer risk perceptions and induce

6S
See, e.g. , Theresa A . Gabaldon, Feminism, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in
Corporate and Securities Law, 5 TEX. J . WOMEN & L. 1, 1-2 ( 1995) (opening her essay
with vignette on ordeal of Lorena Bobbitt, who severed her husband's penis in
response to acts of sexual violence) ; Marleen O'Connor-Felman, American Corporate
Governance and Children: Investing in Our Future Human Capital During Turbulent
Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 255, 1258-66 (2003) (employing stories from her own life,
as well as fictional vignettes, as feminist method of uncovering corporate law's failure
to compel efficient investment in "human capital").
66
U.s. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SMOKING - ATTRIBUTABLE
MORTALITY, MORBIDITY, AND ECONOMIC COSTS (2006) , available at http://www.cdc.gov/
tobacco/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtmVmm5745a3.htm.
·
67 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence ofMarket Manipulation, 1 12 HARV. L. REv. l420, l467 (1999) [hereinafter TBS II).
68 Id. at 1471.
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consumption of cigarette products.69 In the 1 930s, for example,
tobacco companies actually employed doctors and nurses in print
advertisements recommending the companies' brands.70 In the 1 950s
and 1 960s, as the federal government and public health advocates
began to alert consumers to the serious health risks associated with
smoking, the industry ramped up its own efforts to assuage those
concerns. Tobacco firms developed "health reassurance cigarettes,"
products which were in fact not healthier, but which could plaUSibly
be perceived as healthy by consumers who were otherwise already
motivated to conclude that smoking could be consistent with a healthy
lifestyle.7 1 These efforts included the manufacture of filter-tipped and
" low-tar" cigarettes. Tobacco firm managers knew that "smoker
compensation" in the form of increasing the number of cigarettes
smoked or covering the filter holes with their fingers made these
products j ust as deadly to smoke as "regular" cigarettes, but the
impression of a healthier product was successfully conveyed to
consumers such that "by 1980, over fifty percent of cigarettes sold
were 'low-tar.' " 72
The industry also altered their products to manipulate consumers in
ways unrelated to advertiSing. For example, one firm genetically
engineered a strain of tobacco with twice the nicotine - the key
addictive ingredient in cigarettes - of traditional tobacco products.73
O ther tobacco corporations developed chemical mixes that triggered a
more substantial release of nicotine during cigarette consumption,
including adding ammonia to the tobacco, thereby increasing the
addictiveness of the product in ways difficult for consumers to
anticipate or discern.74
Pursuing multi-institutional capture, the tobacco industry
undertook substantial efforts to influence the production and
dissemination of scientific knowledge about smoking.75 By the 1 950s,
there was a well-established consensus in the mainstream scientific
community that cigarette smoking was addictive and highly correlated

69 Id. at 1467- 1502. See generally Jon D. Hanson &: Kyle D. Logue, The Cost of
Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.].
1 163 ( 1 998) (reviewing tobacco regulation proposals in light of erroneous consumer
perception of health risks associated with smoking) .
70 Hanson &: Kysar, TBS II, supra note 67, at 1 472-73.
71 Id. at 1473-79.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1476-77.
74 Id. at 1477.
75 Id. at 1483- 1 500.
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to many debilitating health effects.76 In an effort to maintain
profitability, tobacco companies responded to the "tobacco scare" of
the 1 950s with a decades-long effort to capture the scientific debate
about their product.77 Tobacco firms provided millions of dollars to
fund purportedly independent research centers and controlled the
publication of knowledge such efforts produced. Specifically, the
industry suppressed findings that furthered conventional conclusions
about the relationship between smoking and illness, and broadly
circulated idiosyncratic studies focUSing on genetic or "constitutional"
(that is, dispositional) causes of diseases attributed to smoking.7s
Tobacco corporations also undertook sweeping efforts to insulate
themselves from the regulatory power of legislative, administrative,
and judicial institutions. For example, the tort system's capacity to
contain adverse industry conduct was stymied by relentless litigation
manipulation by tobacco defendants. Such manipulation included the
destruction of documents showing industry knowledge of the
harmfulness of its products, the artificial construction of attorney
client privilege around such evidence by plaCing attorneys in charge of
fundamental research proj ects, and the abuse of discovery mechanics
within specific trials, such as overwhelming plaintiffs with dubious
demands and obfuscatory document production.79 The industry also
poured millions of dollars into lobbying and campaign contributions
at the federal, state, and local levels in efforts to forestall profit-cutting
regulation.so
These various efforts by the tobacco industry were highly successful
and helped make tobacco companies extremely profitable.sl One
scholar estimated total profits from the domestic tobacco industry in
1 996 to be $ 7 . 2 billion, with about 24 billion packs of cigarettes
consumed.s2 Since that time, regulation of the tobacco industry has

76

Id. at 1484, 1 500-02.
See id. at 1489-94; id. at 1488 (citing STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL. , THE CiGARETTE
PAPERS 190-91 ( 1 996» ("Perhaps the most succinct statement of these objectives
comes from a memorandum, believed to have been written by ].V. Blalock, B &: Ws
director of public relations: 'Doubt is our product since it is the best means of
competing with the "body of fact" that exists in the mind of the general public. It is
also the means of establishing a controversy.' ").
78 Id. at 1488-92.
79 Id. at 1488-94 &: n.448.
80 See RICHARD KLUGER, AsHES TO AsHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CiGARETTE WAR,
77

THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 681-90 ( 1997).
81
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
82 Jeffery E. Harris, American Cigarette Manufacturers Ability to Pay Damages:
Overview and a Rough Calculation, 5 TOBACCO CONTROL 292, 292 ( 1996).
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increased substantially.83 In 1 997, the leading tobacco companies
entered into a Master Settlement Agreement with the attorneys general
of all fifty states. The Agreement limited future suits by state
governments seeking to recover the costs of their own health
expenditures related to smoking, and imposed billions of dollars in
annual lump sum payments from tobacco companies to the states, in
perpetuity. Private tort suits, after forty years of failure, have begun to
find success largely because of the revelation, however late, of the
kinds of practices described above.84 Federal and state taxation of
tobacco products has also increased dramatically in recent years, as
have other regulations, including prohibitions against smoking in
restaurants, bars, and other public places.85 Smoking has decreased
somewhat because of these various measures, but the many millions of
premature consumer deaths that preceded them, and that continue
despite them, evidence an ignominious failure of corporate law.86
2.

Food

The problem of market manipulation is also evident in the spread of
overweight and obeSity across all segments of our society, especially
among the poor and communities of co10r.87 ObeSity-related illnesses ,
including heart, liver and kidney diseases, diabetes, and various forms
of cancer, account for an estimated 400,000 deaths per year in the

83 See generally Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 5 1
DEPAUL L . REV. 3 3 1 (2001 ) (reviewing contemporary tobacco regulation).
84 See Rabin, supra note 83, at 337-38.
85 See Kevin Sack, States Look to Tobacco Taxfor Budget Holes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2 1 ,

2008, http://www .nytimes.comJ2008/04/21/usl21 tobacco.html (describing recent
developments in state and federal taxation of tobacco products) ; see also Marot
Williamson, When One Person's Habit Becomes Everyone's Problem: The Battle Over
Smoking Bans in Bars and Restaurants, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J . 1 6 1 , 161 (analyzing
recent developments regarding regulation of smoking in public places).
86 According to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates, 487 billion
cigarettes were consumed in the United States in 1996, compared with 388 billion in 2004.
See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Smoking and Tobacco Abuse,
httpllwww.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statisticsltablesleconomicslexpdcornlindex.htrn
(last
visited Oct. 6, 2009) ; see also Marc Kaufman, Decades-Long Decrease in Smoking Rates Levels
Off, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2007, at A7, available at httpllwww.washingtonpost.coml
wp-dynlcontentlarticlel200711 1/08/ARl0071 10801094.html ("Adult smoking rates declined
more than 15 percent from 1997 to 2004 but have been stubbornly unchanged since.").
87 See Yosifon, Legal Theoretic Inadequacy, supra note 59, at 682-84; see also
Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 58, at 5 1 0-25. See generally Adam
Benforado et al., B roken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645,
1675-89 (2004) (examining problem o f obesity).
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United States, making obesity second only to smoking as the leading
cause of preventable death in the United States.88
The human eating system operates in a manner that is particularly
opaque to conscious human understanding.89 Guided only by intuition
and common sense, individuals frequently misunderstand it. This
nescience makes eating behavior an aspect of human life that is
particularly vulnerable to unseen influence.9o Yet, unlike with
smoking, nearly all consumers must patronize retail markets in food at
some level. These two realities combine to present a market context in
which consumers are acutely, and perhaps uniquely, vulnerable to
manipulation and exploitation.
Evolution has left our species with an eating system oriented
towards consuming highly caloric foods in large quantities whenever
such food is available, irrespective of whether our present energy
needs require such consumption.9 1 During the eons of human hiStory
in which food scarcity was a constant problem, the ability to store
food as fat, combined with an internal compulsion to consume more
food than presently needed, conferred a tremendous survival
advantage .92 The mechanics of the system are most cunning. When in
the presence of food, and rhythmically at times of the day that the
body comes to associate with feeding, the eating system produces the
visceral, subjective experience of hunger (such as the lowering of
blood sugar in anticipation of the otherwise destabilizing influx of
sugar about to be ingested) . Humans consciously and intuitively
interpret the routine experience of hunger as the body Signaling an
imminent need for energy, rather than seeing the process as a tactic in
the body's strategy for long-term energy accumulation. Although
highly beneficial in earlier periods of human evolution, these
clandestine dynamics in our eating systems are both highly
manipulable and potentially deadly under present circumstances.93
Even as lay people typically misperceive the operation of our eating
system, profit-seeking corporations, driven by the pressures of

88

See Benforado et aI. , supra note 87, at 1649 n.5.
See Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 58, at 5 16- 18.
90 Id.
9 1 See Benforado et aI. , supra note 87, at 1678-84.
92 See id. at 1675-78. See generally ALEXANDRA W. LOGUE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EATING
AND DRINKING: AN INTRODUCTION (3d ed. 2004) (synthesizing research on evolutionary
and psychological dimensions of eating behavior) ; ].C. Peters et aI., From Instinct to
Intellect: The Challenge of Maintaining Healthy Weight in the Modem World, 3 OBESITY
REVS. 69 (2002) (analyzing evolutionary development of human eating system).
93 See Benforado et al. , supra note 87, at 1 675-78.
89
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competItIve markets, have discovered as much as (or more than)
evolutionary theorists and biologists about the reality of what moves
humans to eat.94 For example, one of the methods of unseen influence
that retail food corporations have pursued is making food - especially
highly caloric food rich in fat and salt content - ubiquitously available
to consumers in the lived environment. Corporations make such food
available in the places consumers work, rest, drive, study, play, fill up
their cars with gasoline, or wait for trains and planes en route to life's
pursuits.95 Surrounded by such consumption opportunities, the
subjective experience of hunger is triggered in our viscera. When we
respond to that impulse by eating, our dispositionism leads us to the
view the food corporations with which we transact as merely satisfying
the internal, privately ordered preference that we and others around us
have revealed through our consumption.
Another important means through which retail food corporations
have manipulated consumer perceptions, preferences, and risk
assessments, is through advertising.96 In particular, food corporations
have spent billions of dollars promoting "junk food" in a manner that
does little to inform consumers about the consequences of food
consumption, and much to exploit intuitive misconceptions about it.97
Junk food advertising, for example, typically associates junk food
consumption with health and vitality, sexuality, and especially in
a dvertising directed at children, with fantasy and magic.98 Given the
operation of the cognitive heuristics and biases referenced above, it
should come as little surprise that in the wake of multi-billion dollar
promotion of such marketing strategies Americans largely
underestimate the health consequences of the dramatic increases in
weight gain and obeSity witnessed in recent decades.99 Prevailing
consumer-protection statutes construe this kind of advertising as mere
"puffery" and "bluster" that would not influence a person of ordinary

94 Cf Hanson & Kysar, TBS II, supra note 67, at 1467 n.254 ("A different
approach might be to examine the actual market behavior of manufacturers in order
to learn more about cognitive anomalies. Given the powerful market forces driving the
manipulative practices of manufacturers, consumer product markets may represent
the ultimate laboratory for behavioral researchers. " ) .
9 5 See Benforado e t ai. , supra note 8 7 , a t 1689- 1 7 1 1 (describing efforts o f food
corporations to occupy ever-increasing areas of human landscape with retail
opportunities for food consumption).
96 See Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 58, at 5 10-25.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See Yosifon, Legal Theoretic Inadequacy, supra note 59, at 693 n.82 (reviewing
studies).
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reason, therefore holding it to be unactionable as fraud or false
advertising. 100 Such consumer protection regimes begin and end with a
highly dispositionist conception of the reasonable person, and thus
mistakenly conclude that the thoughts, preferences, and behavior of
actual ordinary, normal consumers are not influenced or misled by
such techniques. Of course, the billions spent on puffery by profit
seeking corporations cleanse such dispositionist delusions with the
"acid bath of economics. " 101
In addition to promotion and advertising, retail food corporations
also deploy considerable resources to stagnate legislative and other
regulatory responses to the obesity epidemic. 102 These firms have
pursued such efforts through the plain method of campaign
contributions, and the more subtle technique of promoting the
dispositional view of consumer behavior to regulators and
consumers. 103 Such efforts have been extremely successful in
forestalling robust regulatory responses to the obesity epidemic and
insulating food corporations from liability for the harms associated
with their products. At least twenty-three states have passed so-called
cheeseburger bills, forbidding tort suits against food corporations in
connection with obeSity-related illnesses. 104 Congress is entertaining
similar proposals at the federal level, with legislation such as the
Personal Responsibility in Food Consumer Act in the House and the
Commonsense Consumption Act in the Senate. 105 Meanwhile , with
obesity spreading unabated, some demographers anticipate that in the
United States, "as a result of the substantial rise in the prevalence of
obesity and its life-shortening complications . . . life expectancy at
birth and at older ages could level off or even decline within the first

100

Id. at 687-88.

101

RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 437 ( 1 992) ("Clear thinking . . . is
obstructed by layers of ignorance, ideology, superstition, and prejudice that the acid
bath of economics can help us peel away."). On the implausibility of the puffery
doctrine in consumer protection law, see Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture, supra note
58, at 525-38.
102
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
103
See Benforado et aI., supra note 87, at 1 727-68; Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture,
supra note 58, at 529-38. See generally MICHELE SIMON, ApPETITE FOR PROFIT (2006)
(reviewing food corporations' efforts to stymie regulatory response to obeSity
problem) . One study found that "the various sectors of the food industry made more
than $34 million in campaign contributions just in election year 2000." KELLY D.
BROWNELL &: KATHERINE BATTLE HORGEN, FOOD FIGHT 260 (2004).
104 See David Burnett, Fast-Food Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill: Critiquing
Congress's Response to the Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA. ] . Soc. POL'Y &: L. 357, 365 (2007).
105 See id.
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half of this century," reversing long-term trends of ever increasing
longevity. 106
3.

Dietary Supplements

A third illustration of the problem of consumer exploitation under
the dominant corporate paradigm is the burgeoning retail market for
dietary supplements. Dietary supplements include a wide variety of
products promising to provide the consumer with nutrients that
improve the functioning of the human body, mind, or emotional
system. 107 The Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1 994
("OSHEA" ) defines dietary supplements as products that include a
vitamin, mineral, herb or botanical (other than tobacco) , amino acid,
or any combination of these, which is ingested in the form of a pill,
capsule, powder , or liquid. IOB The supplements industry has grown
dramatically in recent years , spiking from $4 billion in sales in 1994 to
more than $ 20 billion by 2003. 1 09 By some estimates, approximately 60
percent of Americans now regularly ingest some form of dietary
supplement, and nearly 40 percent do so daily. l lo In part, the OSHEA
itself may be responsible for this growth because the legislation
regulates supplements as food products and not as medicines, thus
ensuring that corporations need no pre-approval from the Food and
Drug Administration before bringing their products to market. 1 1 1 At
the same time, the OSHEA allows firms to advertise their products in
medicinal-like terms as improving the functioning of fundamental
bodily processes and structures (such as sleep patterns, digestion, or

106

Stuart j. Olshansky et ai. , A Potential Decline in Life Expectancy in the United
States in the 2 1 st Century, 352 NEW ENG. j. MED. 1 138, 1 142 (2005).
107
See Michael A. McCann, Dietary Supplement Labeling: Cognitive Biases, Market
Manipulation, and Consumer Choice, 31 AM. j .L. & MED. 215, 217 (2005); see also Lars
Noah & Barbara A. Noah, A Drug by Any Other Name . . . ?: Paradoxes in Dietary
Supplement Risk Regulation, 1 7 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 165, 165 (2006).
108 Dietary Supplement Health &: Education Act of 1994, 2 1 U.s.c. § 321(£0 (1994).
109
McCann, supra note 107, at 218.
1 10
Id. at 2 19. Corporate influence in the development and legislative adoption of the
DSHEA is plain to see. According to one report, up to twenty percent of the $20 billion
domestic supplements market is controlled by firms based in Utah. Senator Orrin Hatch
(R-Utah) , who has received hundreds of thousands of dollars in political support from
the supplements companies, championed the DSHEA in a willing, free-market Congress.
See also Jesse Hyde, Healthy Business: Snake Oil or Cure All? Nutrition Supplements are
Booming in Utah, SALT UKE CITY DESERET NEWS, May 22, 2005, http://www.redorbit.com!
newslhealthl1 5 1 236lhealthy_business_snake_oiLoccureall_nutrition_supplements_are
_booming! (last visited July 19, 2008).
III
See McCann, supra note 107, at 2 1 9 .
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bone, muscle, and j Oint strength) . 1 1 2 This combination of food-like
regulation and medicine-like promotion presents substantial
opportunity for consumer confusion and manipulation. 1 13
According to one study of promotional practices in this market,
"largely unregulated supplement labels . . . often express unrealistic
claims and inaccurate content." 1 l4 Although these claims may seem
"unrealistic" to a rational actor, actual consumers nevertheless tend to
believe that a responsible agency has vetted and substantiated the
claims . l l 5 For example, studies show that consumers tend not only to
believe associations that are promoted in the marketing of food
supplements (such as Echinacea remedying flu symptoms and Gingko
improving memory) , but also that the claims have received scientific
validation, which is often not the case .1l6 Supplements corporations
stoke such beliefs through a variety of methods, including by
"obscur [ing] distinctions between their products and medicines
through misleading product names, such as . . . the supplement 'herbal
fen-phen,' which sounds uncannily similar to the diet drug
combination fenflurami."ll7 Because of practices like these, one
scholar concludes that "certain population groups, including the
young and the economically-disadvantaged, excessively underestimate
the relevant risks of dietary supplement consumption." 1 l 8
In his book on the supplements industry, Dan Hurley relays a
disturbing episode that illustrates the ways in which lawyers may be
involved in undermining what regulatory protections consumers do
enjoy in this area. Describing the inefficacy of the DSHEA's
prohibitions against retail sellers of supplements giving medical advice
to customers, Hurley writes:
Although large retailers like Vitamin Shoppe and GNC insist
that they train their employees not to give any advice, the

112
113
Hi
HS

Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 22l.

DAN HURLEY, NATURAL CAUSES: DEATH, LIES, AND POLITICS I N AMERICA'S VITAMIN
AND HERBAL SUPPLEMENT INDUSTRY 19 (2006) (" [A] recent Harris poll found that 68

percent of Americans believe the government requires herbal manufacturers to report
potential side effects or dangers (untrue), 58 percent believe the [Food and Drug
Administration] must approve herbal products before they can be sold (untrue) , and
55 percent believe that manufacturers cannot make claims for their safety or efficacy
without firm scientific evidence (untrue) .").
H6
McCann, supra note 107, at 223.
ll7
Id. at 222.
HB
Id. at 258.
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difficulty of enforcing such policies was addressed at the Las
Vegas
meeting
of the
National Nutritional
Foods
Association . . . . Rakesh Amin, a Chicago attorney [whose
firm lists numerous supplements corporations among its
clients] 1 l9 attempted to untwist DSHEA's pretzel logic . . . .
After explaining that retailers of supplements cannot prescribe
or recommend a particular product for the treatment of any
disease or the relief of any symptoms, Amin asked, "How do
you get around it? Trust me, these consumers are smart. You
have to ask them, 'Have you seen a doctor? Has he diagnosed
anything?' Let them say it. Sometimes you have to act dumb.
'Do you know what you have?' Jay [a fellow speaker,
referenced here as a hypothetical customer] would probably
say he has arthritis. If not, I can tell you a way to get the word
'arthritis' out there. 'We have products that help support
healthy cartilage and joint function.' Then you take them to a
reference area in your store. Without saying 'arthritis: you
point to [ an article about] glucosamine. It's going to say
'arthritis' there." 1 20
According to Hurley, a retailer in the audience asked Amin if it was
permissible to read " third-party literature" provided by the store to
consumers who asked the retailer to read it to them, a request the
questioner suggested was a frequent occurrence in her store. I 2 l
" Technically you can't do it,' Amin said. But realistically, he added,
'You're not going to get caught.' '' 1 22 Hurley reports that retailers
typically fail to abide even by these kinds of subtle evasions of
consumer protections. Employees at twelve out of fifteen retailer
supplement stores Hurley visited in 2004 "did not hesitate to
recommend multiple supplements to treat multiple conditions." 123
The point, for present purposes, is that consumer vulnerability and
manipulation, rather than simply consumer competence and genuine
satisfaction of preferences, may be an important factor in accounting
for the profitability of firms operating in the supplements market. The
1 1 9 See
Amin Talati, Representative Clients, http://www.amintalati.com!
RepresentativeClients/tabidl1 155/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
120 HURLEY, supra note 1 1 5, at 212- 1 3 ; see also E-mail from author to Rakesh M .
Amin, Partner a t Amin Talati (Oct. 1 0 , 2008) (on file with author) (asking Mr. Amin
if he wanted to comment on characterization of his words in Hurley's book; after
acknowledging receipt of my query, he supplied no reaction).
1 2 l HURLEY, supra note 1 1 5, at 213.
m Id.
m Id.
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imperatives of shareholder primacy operating in competitive markets
forces firms to discern and exploit the reality that consumers are far
more susceptible to situational influence in their thinking and
behavior than consumers or corporate law appreciates.

C.

The Corporate Nature of the Market Manipulation Problem

The routine preparation and provision of food and fundamental
nutrition has, until relatively recently, been regulated within the home
or extended community networks under an ethic of care.124 Long after
human societies developed from subsistence hunting and gathering
arrangements into social systems characterized by specialized
production, wage labor, and trade, fundamental consumption needs
continued to be managed within the intimate confines of the private
sphere. 1 25 Without romanticizing an ahistorical conception of the
home as a haven in a heartless world, one can appreciate that
124

As recently as 1 977, for example, Americans consumed 82 percent of their total
calories at home. By 1994, that figure had dropped to 67 percent. GREG CRITSER, FAT
LAND: How AMERICANS BECAME THE FATTEST PEOPLE IN THE WORLD 32-33 (2004) (citing
Biing-Hwan Lin et aI., Nutrient Contribution of Food Away from Home, in America's
Eating Habits: Changes and Consequences, in AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION BULLETIN 213
(1999) ("[Ilf food away from home had the same average nutritional densities as food
at home . . . Americans would have consumed 197 fewer calories per day."» .
125
See O'Connor-Felman, supra note 65, at 1281 (" [TJ he factory detached work
from the household, transforming the family from a self-sufficient production and
consumption unit to a consumption division."); see also Gardiner C. Means, Collective
Capitalism and Economic Theory, in THE CORPORATION TAKE-OVER 62, 64 (Andrew
Hacker ed. , 1964) (noting that in substance systems, "each economic unit produced
only for its own consumption and . . . there was no buying and selling") . In such
systems:
[Tlhe market plays a negligible role, and production is organized within the
village or tribe on a collective basis to meet the needs of the produces who
are also consumer. In such subsistence economies, consumers are in control
of production, or what is more important . . . consumer, worker, owner and
management are combined in a single economic unit. As a result production
policy and the instruments of production are controlled by units which
combine the interests of consumer, worker, owner, and management.
Id. at 67. One need not regard this merely as symbolic discourse on imagined human
social origins; indeed, it can concretely be seen in the first legal corporations to
operate in America, such as in the corporate colonial settlements in Virginia. Id. at 69.
All of the other categorizations of "nongovernmental" control of production identified
by Means exclude consumers from the equation. These include individual control
over production (with no wage-labor) and market-based consumption; private control
over production (with wage labor) and market-based consumption; and finally,
separation of ownership and control over production (with widely held equity
stakeholder and wage labor) with market-based consumption. See id. at 64.
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fundamental elements of human existence have only recently been
turned over as expansively to competitive retail markets and the
potentially manipulative dynamics therein as they are today. 1 26
However, it is not market activity alone that induces the market
manipulation dynamic . The corporate form unleashes market
manipulation even where such opportunities would go unused in
other market-based systems. Part of what is absent (or marginalized)
in corporate activity is the operation of powerful norms and moral
restraints against exploitation, which in noncorporate contexts
constrain the manipulative purveyance of goods. An individual or a
family that would never consider hawking junk food to children for a
living might be willing to invest a small part of their income, earned
through labor they confidently consider both remunerative and
socially useful, in a junk food corporation. The moral impulse that
would keep one from engaging in exploitative conduct is visceral. 1 27 It
is the subjective experience of moral sentiment, not abstract moral
reasoning and deduction, whic h has the most direct influence on
conduct. 1 28
The nesting that occurs through institutional investment
exacerbates this loss of the moral restraint on exploitation. Even
people who would not invest their own savings directly in a junk food
corporation might easily place their savings with institutional funds
run by managers who would think nothing of doing so. Indeed, the
fund managers might think that it was their obligation to do so if it
would maximize return to their investors. 1 29 Individuals contributing

126

O'Connor-Felman, supra note 65, at 1 288 (citing SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF, THE
FEMININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC MAN: REVIVING THE ROLE OF FAMILY IN THE POST
INDUSTRIAL AGE x ( 1 997) ("Getting 'women's work' done when women are no longer
volunteering their unpaid or underpaid labor is what much of the public discussion of
family values is really about. ")). If we appreciate that some consumer interests are not
satisfactorily left to competitive markets, the public discussion of corporate law might
usefully join public conversations about family values.
1 27
See Hanson &: Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 32, at 1 15-20
(stressing crucial role of salience in dynamics of human affective evaluations and in
concomitant behavioral responses). See generally June Price Tangney et aI., Moral
Emotions and Moral Behavior, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 345 (2007) (emphasizing
importance of "moral emotions" as crucial mediating factor between intellectual
embrace of moral standards and practice of moral behavior) .
1 28
See Tangney et aI., supra note 1 27, at 346 ("Moral emotions provide the
motivational force - the power and energy - to do good and to avoid doing bad.").
1 29
See O'Connor-Felman, supra note 65, at 1 329 ("[I]nstitutional shareholders
have become the dominant owners in corporate America; the one thousand largest
companies in the United States have an average institutional ownership of sixty
percent."); see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the public Interest, 80
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their capital to corporate enterprise through participation in savings
plans typically do not know where their money is going. The human
consequences of diversified equity investments in corporate
enterprises are distant and pallid, absent from one's immediate
experience of personal influence in the world. Where the restraining
regulatory impulse of norms and values is lost, as it is in the context of
the large publicly traded corporation, consumers lose an important
extra-legal mechanism for monitoring their interests. It is in this sense
that market manipulation is distinctly a corporate law problem, and
not simply endemic to all systems of contract or market exchange.

D.

Social Responsibility and the Consumer Collective Action Problem

The preceding Parts explored the corporate manipulation of
consumer risk perception. Another important category of consumer
interest relates to the social consequences of consumption and of
corporate activities in general. 1 30 Under the conventional paradigm,
the elevation of the consumer to the position of sovereign, both in the
sense of being free and in the sense of commanding the firm,
scapegoats the consumer as the party truly responsible for SOcially
deleterious corporate activity. l3l After all, if corporations devour
rainforests, fill landfills with nondegradable waste, and pollute the
waters and air, it can only be because consumers demand ever more
products at ever-cheaper prices. If consumers do indeed represent
society generally, then such consumption demonstrates that the social
effects of corporate behavior are not actually adverse after all, because
they reflect collective preferences. 1 32 If consumers really cared about
corporate social responsibility, they would only patronize SOcially
responsible firms.
The kind of manipulation of consumer perceptions discussed above,
however, also applies to corporate social responsibility concerns.
Consumers may find it difficult to understand the social issues
involved in producing or consuming particular products or services.

N .Y.U. L. REV. 733, 817 (2005) ("They may not even know what corporations their
investment fund managers invest in, let alone precisely what all those corporations are
doing, and they won't appear on the shareholder lists of any rapacious corporations.").
130
See generally Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 1 18 HARV. L. REV. 525, 528-29
(2004) (exploring these two senses of consumer interest) .
I3l
Cj. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 23, at 1 78-82 (criticizing consumers not only for
impact of their socially adverse preferences, but also, writing in 1974, for rampant
shoplifting and vandalism of corporate property) .
132
See Debow &: Lee, supra note 37, at 417-18.
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Indeed, where the effects are deleterious, this is an understanding that
firms have a stake in obfuscating. Even where certain corporations are
associated with socially pernicious business practices, consumers will
often find it difficult to track which firms are associated with what
products. Consumers identify products by brand name, not by the
corporation selling them, in no small part because this is how
corporations advertise the items. 133 Contemporary consumer
protection statutes are even less likely to insulate consumers from
misleading practices with respect to the social consequence of
p roduction than they are with respect to the personal consequences of
consumption. 1 34
Even where consumers have all the information they need about the
social effects of consumption, however, a collective action problem
u ndermines the viability of consumer sovereignty as a reliable device
for advancing consumer interests in the social effects of consumption.
Consider the following situation: suppose that pate de foie gras sells for
$ 9 per unit if firms produce it through husbanding methods that are
destructive to the environment, and that it sells for $lO if produced by
more sustainable methods. 135 Suppose also that consumers individually
understand and care about the social harm caused by the polluting
production method, and that they would prefer that firms not use such
production methods. Even under this scenario, individual consumers
still have an incentive to purchase the $9 pate de foie gras. If each
consumer thinks she has an idiosyncratic view of the production issue,
and doubts that her fellow consumers will care enough to patronize the
more expense pate, then she knows that the environment will be
degraded no matter what she does. Thus, she might as well purchase
the cheaper pate and pocket the $ 1 savings. On the other hand, if she
believes her fellow consumers care enough about environmental
degradation that they will patronize the more expensive pate, then she
knows that the environment will be saved no matter what she does.
Thus, she will purchase the $9 pate in order to pocket the $ 1 savings
and still enj oy the sustained environment. Because all consumers make
these same assessments, nobody forebears from consuming the

1 33 See CHRISTOPHER STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENDS : THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
CORPORATIONS 89-90 ( 1975 ) .
1 34 See Kysar, supra note 1 3 0 , at 553-62, 569-79.
I35 The following discussion is based on Elhauge's analysis, supra note 129, at 7505 1 . I have substituted pate for Elhauge's discussion of furniture production in order to
presage my discussion of Lovenheim v. IroquoiS Brands, Ltd., infra text accompanying
notes 240-46.
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cheaper, environmentally degrading pate, even though all consumers
individually would prefer the $ 1 0 pate.
Although this example is highly stylized, real-world scenarios of this
sort may be evident in certain markets. For example, one study
showed that while consumers in surveys express a willingness to pay
more for gasoline that is environmentally sensitive, actual consumer
behavior indicates that, given the option, consumers tend to choose
the cheaper, environmentally unfriendly option. 1 36 Rather than reading
this as evidence that consumers are duplicitous in surveys about their
preferences, the finding instead may reflect the consumer collective
action problem. Where this problem arises, consumer choices do not
reveal consumer preferences and do not provide the disciplining
power over sOcially deleterious corporate conduct that the dominant
paradigm promises. Nexus of contracts theorists might be undisturbed
by this collective action problem, as they would likely seek escape in
the rescuing power of external regulation. But the consumer collective
action problem can no more readily be overcome by consumers acting
in the political realm than it can through collective consumptive
action in the market.
III.

VINDICATING THE CONSUMER INTEREST IN C ORPORATE LAw

Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
- Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo 1 37
Now I submit that you can not abandon emphasis on 'the view
that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making
profits for their shareholders' until such time as you are
prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of
responsibilities to someone else.
- Adolf A. Berle 1 38

136
See Elhauge, supra note 1 29, at 75 1 n.28 (citing Paul R. Portney, Corporate
Social Responsibility: An Economic and Public Policy Perspective, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS (Bruce Hay et al. eds., 2005)) .
137 Meinhard v. Salmon, 1 64 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (describing standard of
conduct required of fiduciary to her principal).
138
Berle, supra note 37, at 1367.
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I speak the pass-word primeval, I give the sign of democracy.
- Walt Whitman 1 39

A.
l.

The Benevolent Throne: Managerialism

Operational Restraint and Corporate Giving

There are alternative models of corporate governance that might
vindicate the consumer interes t in corporate governance where the
nexus of contracts shareholder primacy model falls short. One
important alternative argues that corporate directors should have (and
do in fact have) the discretion to balance the interests of shareholders
with the interests of other corporate stakeholders, including workers,
creditors, communities, and, potentially, consumers. "Managerialism,"
as this approach might broadly be called, has a long pedigree in
corporate theory, but Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have most
recently given it sophisticated explication in their "team production"
model of the corporation. 1 40
Blair and Stout argue that the corporation is best conceived of as a
" team" comprised of various s takeholders whose contributions are
managed and distributed by the crucial "mediating hierarch" that is
the firm's board of directors. 1 4 1 The directors are not supposed to
maximize the interests of any individual team member, but rather the
p erformance of the team as a whole such that there are greater spoils
for all to share . 1 42 Team members submit to the mediating hierarch
because they know that collective action problems, transaction costs,
and failures of imagination keep them from plausibly "contracting" to
a superior arrangement with other parties to the team. 1 43
1 39 Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, in LEAVES OF GRASS 45 (The Modem Library, Inc.
1921). Thanks to Stephen Yosifon for sending me this Whitman line.
140 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 25 1 ( 1999).
141 See id.
1 4 2 See id.
1 43 Id. at 250-5 1 (building on progressive critiques of nexus of contracts theory that
have emphasized indeterminate, unfixed, and relational nature of stakeholder
interactions housed uncomfortably in n exus of contracts conception) . Kent Greenfield
summarizes the inadequacy of "contract" in construing workers' necessarily relational
corporate involvement:

[W] orkers' claims against the corporation are not, in any meaningful sense,
fixed . . . . [ they] have both implicit and explicit claims against the
enterprise that are more valuable when the company does well and are
worth less (or nothing) when the company does poorly. Unfixed, explicit
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Team production theorists contend that their model is not only
more desirable than the dominant shareholder primacy approach, but
that it also has the added benefit of better explaining positive
corporate law. Notwithstanding oft-repeated citations to Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co. , 144 these scholars argue that because of the "business
judgment rule," directors have tremendous discretion to manage firms
however they see fit. 1 45 Under the business judgment rule, courts will
not evaluate the substance of corporate decisions nor hold directors
liable for poor or even negligent decisions that harm shareholders , so
long as directors make business decisions in good faith, in an
informed manner, and are themselves disinterested in the transactions.
Proponents of the nexus of contracts theory view the business
claims against the company might include pension plans, 401(k) accounts,
or other retirement benefits . . . . Unfixed, implicit claims might include
understandings about job security or promotion policies, the development of
firm-specific human capital, and the safety of working conditions.
GREENFIELD, supra note 32, at 55. Progressive critiques have also claimed that there
are numerous reasons that nonshareholding stakeholders - paradigmatically workers
- may have a greater need for their interests to be monitored at the corporate
governance level than do shareholders. For example, highly robust and efficient
contemporary capital markets make it very easy for shareholders to "exit"
underperforming firms by selling their stock and re-investing in more promising
enterprises. Workers, on the other hand, once having invested their labor in a
particular firm, have much less flexibility with respect to exit. This suggests that
workers may be in as much, if not greater, need for "primacy" in the firm's concerns
as are shareholders. Id.
144 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. , 1 70 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (holding that " [a]
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders"). The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that Henry Ford's refusal to
pay dividends violated his fiduciary duty to the Dodge brothers, who were minority
shareholders in Ford Motor Company, because of Ford's express intention to instead
use the firm's profits to lower prices and "employ still more men, to spread the
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number." Blair and Stout
argue that the case is best read as an outlier in which the court is responding more to
Ford's cavalier attitude towards minority shareholders than it is an adumbration of
bedrock corporate governance law, which is typically extremely deferential to
directorial discretion. The court's decision can also be read as a curb on Ford's self
dealing, in that his announced reasons for refusing to pay dividends may have been
pretext for his desire to keep the Dodge brothers from using their dividends to fund
their own automobile company, which they ultimately did. See Blair & Stout, supra
note 140, at 301-05 ; see also Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v.
Ford, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 1 63, 1 70-72 (2009) (arguing that central lesson of
shareholder primacy that is typically drawn by teachers and students from Dodge
inaccurately expresses fundamental tenets of corporate law) .
145 See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co. , 383 N.Y.S.2d 809 (N.Y. 1976) ("Mere
errors of judgment are not sufficient as grounds for equity interference, for the powers
of those entrusted with corporate management are largely discretionary.").
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judgment rule as necessary to give directors, rather than unqualified
shareholders or courts, the authority to make judgments about the
most prudent paths to profit. 1 46 Team production theorists, however,
argue that the business j udgment rule is better understood as a rule
that provides directors sufficient insulation from shareholder demands
such that they can successfully balance and advance all stakeholders'
interests in firm management. 1 47 Team production theory also finds
support for the mediating hierarch concept in the fact that nearly
every state's corporate law explicitly authorizes directors to consider
the interests of constituencies other than shareholders when
navigating the firm through predatory hostile takeover attempts. 1 48
Further, corporate law in most states authorizes directors to engage in
charitable activity even where such giving is unrelated to profit
maximization. 1 49 Shareholders do serve a unique and crucial corporate
monitoring role by voting, suing (principally for breaches of loyalty by
firm directors) , and threatening exit, but such monitoring activity
should not, team production theorists insist, be mistaken as
evidencing shareholders' exclusive right to the benefits of corporate
governance. ISO
Scholars employing the team production framework typically focus
on the implications of the model for worker interests in firm
operations. 1 5 1 Most team production theorists gloss over the consumer
interest just as cursorily as do conventional nexus of contracts
scholars. Indeed, while nexus of contract scholars typically list
consumers in their first-cut description of the parties to the nexus, it is
not clear whether team production scholars consider consumers "part

146
The rule is a way of enforcing the basic governance design of corporations,
which is that they are to be managed by a board of directors. Any substantive
approach to duty of care analysis would simply replace these decision-makers with
some other less competent group. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 106-08 (2008) [hereinafter NEW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE] ; see also EASTERBOOK &: F ISCHEL, supra note 13, at 93- 102.
147 See Blair &: Stout, supra note 140, at 299-306.
148
See generally Steven Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate
Constituency Statutes and Fonnulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163
( 1991) (compiling and analyzing statutes).
149
See Elhauge, supra note 129, at 763.
150
See Blair &: Stout, supra note 140, at 289 ("Shareholders enjoy special legal
rights not because they have some unique claim on directors, but because they often
are in the best position to represent the interests of the coalition that comprises the
firm."); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 5 79, 598 ( 1992) (discussing mistaken
conflation of fiduciary obligation with monitoring task of shareholders).
151
See generally GREENFIELD, supra note 32 (syntheSizing literature).
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of the team" at all. 1 52 Nevertheless, the team production model
provides a more flexible framework through which to analyze the
consumer interest in the corporate world . In particular, the mediating
hierarch concept has made a place for an exciting new literature on
the place of moral values and social norms in corporate governance,
emphasizing as it does the role of extra-contractual collaboration. 1 53
For example, Einer Elhauge builds on team production theory and
argues that firm managers must (and do) have the discretion to give
effect to profit-sacrificing norms and morality in their management of
the firm. 1 54 Norms and morality shape our behavior in a socially useful
direction, with both the threat of opprobrium, and the mental anguish
that comes with it, and the promise of approbation and its attendant
visceral delighL I 55 Elhauge contends that in many areas of social life,
norms and morality (e.g. , the proscription of explOitative conduct)
operate alongside law in a manner that produces greater social utility
than could either norms or law operating alone. 1 56 Indeed, "social and
moral sanctions are efficient precisely because they can induce each of
us to engage in conduct that is collectively beneficial yet individually
unprofitable. " 157 If this is true, then " [a] norm of pure profit1 52 Blair & Stout, supra note 140, at 278. Elsewhere the consumer seems to be
almost explicitly excluded from Blair and Stout's definition of the team:

The interests of the corporation . . . can be understood as a jOint welfare
function of all the individuals who make firm-specific investments and agree
to participate in the extracontractual, internal mediation process within the
firm. For most public corporations, these are primarily executives, rank-and
file employees, and equity investors, but in particular cases the corporate
team may also include other stakeholders such as creditors, or even the local
community if the firm has strong geographic ties.
[d. at 288.
153 See id. at 264 ("Our break with previous work is to stress the importance of the
coordination that happens not from the top down, but in the lateral interaction among
team members.").
154 See Elhauge, supra note 1 29, at 796-805.
155 See id. at 747-56.
1 56 Id. at 752.
1 57 Id. at 752. In the corporate context, Elhauge argues:

[Tlhe typical example involves others (like workers or suppliers) making
firm-specific investments that increase the business's efficiency because they
trust that the business will comply with social or moral norms against
opportunistically exploiting those investments later by failing to reward
them. Such a norm is efficient ex ante, but compliance with it after sunk
benefits are received can be ex post unprofitable and thus require non
monetary social or moral sanctions for enforcement.
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maximization" in corporate governance law "overinclusively demands
that managers also maximize corporate profits even when such
activity . . . violates the social and moral norms we traditionally use to
optimize behavior." 1 58 Thus, scholars and policymakers must embrace
profit-sacrificing norms and morality manifesting in the decision
making of directors, as an important mechanism in corporate
governance. 1 59
Elhauge argues that corporate law has always given the corporate
boards the discretion to pursue the synergy of law and norms to
restrain corporate activity that would otherwise unduly and
inefficiently harm nonshareholding stakeholders. 160 After all, directors,
as the public face of the firm, are the parties most likely to be socially
sanctioned or rewarded by the firm's moral failure or accomplishment.
If shareholders challenged such profit-sacrificing conduct, directors
could plaUSibly claim that their conduct, although appearing to
privilege nonshareholder interests, was in fact aimed at advancing the
profitability of the firm, such as by improving relationships with
consumers, workers, or the community. 161 Elhauge argues that the
hostile takeover movement of the 1980s gave the lie to such pre
textual justifications and forced the corporate world to recognize that
not all sOcially responsible firm conduct is profitable. 162 Multiple
constituency and antitakeover statutes redeemed and made explicit

ld.

at 753.
1 58 ld. at 814.
1 59 Elhauge acknowledges,

but does not snag on the possibility, that socially useful
conduct can be profitable; he is interested, as I am, in examining corporate conduct
that is profitable but not socially useful. ld.
1 60 Elhauge recognizes that the social utility of norms and morals regulation
presupposes the correctness, or the utility, of the norms that are given effect. Racist
and sexist norms, for example, may undermine social utility. But this problem does
not deter Elhauge's profit-sacrificing corporate law agenda, for "this problem is
equally true of legal and economic sanctions" on which we would otherwise be relying
to advance the social weal. ld. at 755. " [ I l t is enough that social and moral sanctions
would on balance advance the outcomes that our society views as desirable, which is
the normative perspective relevant for determining the level of managerial discretion
that society will want to allow." ld.
1 61 ld. at 770-72 (citing Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. 1968» (finding
that where shareholders of Chicago Cubs sued Wrigley for failing to install lights at
Cubs' ballpark, business judgment rule precluded shareholders from second-guessing
Wrigley's decision, which he asserted was in best interests of company) .
1 62 That is, if there are individuals or funds that are genuinely unmoved to sacrifice
profit for moral or norms reasons, then they will find it profitable to take over firms
that can be made to operate more profitably than they presently do, restrained as they
are by norms and morals. That the takeover movement happened demonstrates that
there was such profit-sacrificing restraint in the market.
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what had long been obvious i n corporate governance - directors have
wide discretion to operate firms in a profit-sacrificing manner that is
responsive to the needs of multiple stakeholders, including in the
public interest, broadly construed.
Some of the central arguments of feminist corporate law scholars
contribute to the norms, values, and morality trajectory in the
"managerialist" style. 1 63 Feminist scholars have repeatedly pointed to
the diversification of corporate boards as a way of advancing women's
interests in corporate enterprise, and the interests of nonshareholding
stakeholders generally. These scholars argue that corporate boards,
presently comprised of more than 80 percent men in publicly traded
companies, suffer from a dearth of women's perspectives, experiences,
and capacities in corporate governance. l64 Feminist "concepts of care
and connection" can enable attention to a "wider array of
constituents" than is presently seen in corporate governance. 165 This
can be accomplished both by repudiating the limitations of gendered
conceptions of the directors' proper role and by diversifying the
composition of the boards charged with those responsibilities. 166 For
example, Marleen O'Connor-Felman has argued that, " [ ml ore women
on corporate boards are needed to present different perspectives about
work-family policies. Work-family scholars report that one of the
main problems preventing the successful implementation of work
family programs is that CEOs set the tone of the corporation's culture
,,
and most CEOs simply do not 'get it.' 167 Feminist corporate law

163

See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
See Kelly Y. Testy, Capitalism and Freedom - For Whom ?: Feminist Legal Theory
and Progressive Corporate Law, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 95-99 (2004) ; see also
Theresa A. Gabaldon, Corporate Conscience and the White Man's Burden, 70 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 944, 95 1 -54 (2002). Other feminist corporate law scholarship has
challenged even more basic doctrines of the modern corporate form, such as limited
shareholder liability. See, e.g. , Ronnie Cohen, Feminist Thought and Corporate Law: It's
Time to Find Our Way Up from the Bottom (Line) , 2 AM. U . j . GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 1 ,
2 4 ( 1994) ("One o f the defining characteristics o f the modern corporation, the
concept of limited shareholder liability, is anti-feminist from the outset. Alienation
and compartmentalization of different spheres of existence is one of the main themes
criticized in feminist thought. Separation of the investor from the productive use of
her assets is but one pernicious form of alienation.").
165
Testy, supra note 164, at 98.
166
See, e.g. , id. at 106 ("The dominant conception of directors' duties looks rather
much like the traditional conceptions of a father's parenting role: sitting in an easy
chair, feet up, martini in hand, and glad that no one is telling him that there is any
trouble in the house. Duties of care and loyalty need to move from a fatherly
configuration to a motherly one.").
167 O'Connor-Felman, supra note 65, at 1349.
164
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scholars have not specifically turned their attention to the predicament
of consumers. N evertheless, their ideas contribute to the managerialist
claim that directors may be able to prevent consumer exploitation if
corporate boards encompass sufficient sensitivities and are granted
sufficient discretion.
But relying on the benevolent discretion of firm managers is a very
limited mechanism for protecting otherwise vulnerable consumer
interests. For example, Elhauge envisions a kind of reasonable
shopkeeper standard in his conception of permissible profit-sacrificing
conduct by corporate boards. 168 Elhauge contends that " [ tl he
affirmative reason to allow corporate management to temper profit
maximization is to subj ect corporate decisions to the same social and
moral processes that apply to sole proprietors when they run
businesses. " 169 But such discretion should be bound, in Elhauge's
estimation, to 1 0 percent of the profits that could be obtained in
u nfettered corporate operations. 170 That kind of sacrifice may advance
the consumer interest to some extent. But the limited discretion of
directors is insufficient protection against the relentlessly competitive
market that shareholder primacy in corporate governance otherwise
unleashes. The profit-sacrificing conduct Elhauge claims exists is
"powerfully limited by managerial profit-sharing or stock options,
product market competition, the labor market for corporate officials,
the need to raise capital, the threat of takeover, and the prospect of
being ousted by shareholder vote . " l7l Managerialism is weak medicine,
it is limited not only by the shareholder-centric monitoring of efficient
capital markets, but also by positive law, which, for example, puts

1 68 See infra note 1 69 and accompanying text.
1 69 Elhauge, supra note 1 29, at 844. This idea, while formally elaborated by
Elhauge, has been in the literature for some time. See Dodd, supra note 15, at 1 1 6 1
( " [ A j development o f business ethics which goes beyond the requirements o f law and
beyond the dictates of enlightened self-interest is impossible in these days when most
business is incorporated unless it can touch incorporated business enterprises as well
as those conducted by individual owners. As a practical matter, this can happen only if
the managers of such corporations have some degree of legal freedom to act upon
such an attitude . . . . ").
170 Elhauge, supra note 1 29, at 836. Corporate charitable giving represents "only
1 .0-1 .3% of corporate income." ld. N evertheless, Elhauge's "tithing" parameter is
meant to capture both categories. ld. at 846.
l7l
ld. at 840. For Elhauge this is as it should be. His account shares the Panglosian
tone familiar to the economic analysis of law. We already have the best of all possible
worlds, corporate law is complete, coherent, and correct: "The law just needs to be
careful to bound the amount of profit-sacrificing discretion . . . when special
circumstances undermine the ordinary ability of market constraints to do so." ld. at 813.
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substantive limits on corporate charitable giving and makes directors
vulnerable to weak but still threatening shareholder derivative suits. 1 72
Without duties to consumers that are enforceable by consumers,
directors have an incentive to err always on the side of advancing
shareholder interests rather than the interests of the corporation as a
whole. Lawrence Mitchell argues that "notwithstanding judicial
suggestions that directors' duties to the corporation may be broader
than those to the stockholders . . . without any contradictory method
of enforcement, directors can be expected to act solely in the interests
of stockholders." 173 Perhaps not solely, according to the insights of
team production theory, but still, absent some alternative enforcement
mechanism, directors can be expected to act mostly in the interests of
stockholders.

2.

Shareholder Activism

Among corporate stakeholders, only shareholders have the power to
influence corporate governance directly. One could consider reliance
on shareholders to exercise that power in service of the consumer
interest a subcategory of managerialism. Shareholders are responsible
for the routine election of directors and the episodic authorization of
maj or transactions, such as mergers or dissolutions. Through voting
on such matters, shareholders could theoretically expand or narrow
the bounds of operational restraint in the consumer interest. In
practice, however, the vast maj ority of shareholders remain rationally
ignorant of routine corporate elections, knowing that their own votes
will have little effect on the outcome of an election and that their
diversified investments leave them with little stake in any given
corporate election. l74
Beyond voting for directors, the most prominent method of
shareholder influence is the "shareholder proposal" mechanism
provided by the federal securities laws. 1 75 Rules promulgated by the

172
For example, the federal tax code allows corporations to deduct up to 10
percent of pre-tax profits as charitable donations. I.R.c. § 1 70(b)(2) (West 2008) . In
Delaware, corporate giving is capped by a "reasonableness" standard, which looks to
the tax code for guidance. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 6 1 (Del. 1991).
173 Mitchell, supra note 150, at 605.
174 Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1 16 1 , 1 1 71 ( 1981) (explaining that
rational shareholders have little incentive to become informed about routine corporate
elections) .
175 See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAw AND ECONOMICS 495505 (2002) (analyzing shareholder proposal mechanism).
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Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") permit shareholders to
include proposals for reforming corporate policies in the firm's proxy
materials. 176 The SEC allows shareholders to make proposals with
respect to "social issues" relating to the firm, even if the social issue
does not bear directly on the profitability of the corporate
enterprise. 177 For example, shareholder activists used social issue
proposals to pressure firms to divest from South Africa during the
apartheid era. Contemporary efforts include shareholder proposals to
require firms to offer health benefits to the families of gay workers on
the same terms as those provided heterosexual families. 1 78 To date,
however, the mechanism has not been taken up directly in favor of
consumer concerns. Indeed, far from ameliorating the excesses of
shareholder primacy, the shareholder proposal mechanism may
ultimately come to exacerbate the problem. Today, institutional
shareholders increasingly use the proposal mechanism to promote
corporate governance reforms that narrow directors' (potentially
profit-sacrificing) discretion and make them more accountable to
shareholders. 1 79 In any event, social issue shareholder proposals are
usually opposed by incumbent boards, which can use the corporate
treasury to promote their opposition. Such proposals typically fail
when put before all shareholders for a vote. 180
In the annals of attempted corporate governance reform, the historic
failure of The Campaign to Make General Motors More Responsible
( "Proj ect GM") provides an effective illustration of the limited utility
of shareholder activism as a means of advanCing consumer interests. 1 8 1

176

Id.

177

Id.

178

Id.

at 501-05.

179
Id. at 496 ( " [ T J he rule . . . is increasingly being used by institutional investors
to press matters more closely related to corporate governance. For example, proposals
in recent years have included such topicS as repealing takeover defenses, confidential
proxy voting, regulating executive compensation, and the like."). Hansmann and
Kraakman point to the fact that worker pension programs have been espeCially vocal
in advocating the view that firms should maximize profits on behalf of shareholders as
evidence in support of their "end of the world" thesis. Some progressive scholars, on
the other hand, argue that unions as institutional investors have used their
shareholder powers to influence corporate receptivity to union organizing activity,
settling strikes, and ensuring against the entrenchment of anti-union managers. See
Marleen O'Connor, Labor's Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22
COMPo LAB. L. &: POL'y] . 97, 1 14- 15 (2000).
ISO
See Harwell Wells, Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 5 1 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 1 13-17 (2002).
lSI
See generally Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections
on Project GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419 ( 1971) (chronicling and analyzing implications of
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Undertaken in 1970 by a group of corporate law reformers, with the
backing of consumer activist Ralph Nader, Project GM bought twelve
shares of stock in General Motors, Inc. ("GM") and authored several
potentially transformative shareholder proposals. 182 The most
prominent one called for GM to create a Shareholders Committee for
Corporate Responsibility, which would gather facts and make
recommendations on some basic questions concerning GM's "role in
modern society and its prospects for and possible means of achieving a
proper balance between the interests of shareholders, employees,
,
consumers, and the general public. , 1 83 Another proposal sought to
expand the number of directors on GM's board - slots that Proj ect
GM hoped to fill with sOcially conscious directors. In short, Proj ect
GM sought to stoke a managerialist ethos within GM through
shareholder activism, and to provide an institutional mechanism that
could advance the interests of multiple stakeholders. The campaign
attracted substantial attention in the business community and in the
mainstream press. 1 84 GM's board of directors, however, opposed
Project GM's proposals and deployed considerable resources urging
shareholders to defeat them. 1 8s The shareholders obliged in massive
proportions. 186 Neither of the proposals received more than 3 percent
of the voted shares. According to one scholar who served as counsel
for Project GM, "Proj ect leaders believed that a proxy contest with
General Motors would afford them an opportunity to gain attention
for their efforts and would provide a test of the ability of corporate and
economic system to reform itself." 1 87 The failure of that test illustrates
the limitations of managerialism and shareholder activism as a means
to vindicate consumer interests.

B.
l.

The Golden Yoke: Multifiduciarism

Stakeholder Duty and Enforcement

One way to improve upon the impotence of managerialism would be
to require, rather than merely allow, directors to attend to consumer

"Project GM") .
182 [d. at 423.
183
ld. at 424.
184

[d.

185

David L. Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on
the Rule of"One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29 ( 1970) .
186 [d. at 30.
187 Schwartz,
supra note 181, at 423.
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interests at the firm governance level. 1 88 Proponents of shareholder
primacy have rej ected the possibility of a multiple fiduciary corporate
governance regime, arguing that it is impossible for directors to serve
more than one principal at the same time, and that directors would
only seize on the intractability of a multi-fiduciary injunction to more
easily exploit the firm for their own interests. As Easterbrook and
Fischel put it, " [A j manager told to serve two masters (a little for the
equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and
,,
is answerable to neither. 1 89 This view is logically suspicious, as the
problem of simultaneously serving multiple interests is present even
under a strict shareholder primacy regime - directors must determine
how to balance the short-term, mid-term, and long-term interest of
shareholders, and the sometimes-distinct interests of different classes
of shareholders. 190 Ron Chen and Jon Hanson have also noted that the
claim that multiple fiduciary obligations would be cacophonous in
corporate governance contradicts the dominant view's basic certainty
that shareholder primacy serves all stakeholders because all
stakeholders' interests already align. 191 Nor is the obligation to attend
to multiple interests unknown in human activity; it is of course always
present in our most personal decision making, and in our most public
governance (e.g . , adversarial litigation, bicameral legislatures, and
three-branched governance) . The objection is further cast into doubt
188 Proponents of the dominant regime often mistakenly conflate multifiduciary
regimes with permissive managerialist approaches. For example, after quoting from
statutes stating that directors "may" consider other stakeholders, DeBow and Lee
write: "Both the anti takeover statutes and the constituency statutes change the focus
of directors' and managers' efforts and legal duties in hostile takeovers from the
welfare of shareholder-owners to the welfare of both shareholder and nonshareholder
constituencies." Debow &: Lee, supra note 37, at 403. Compare in the area of legal
ethics a rule permitting lawyers to reveal client confidences in support of third-party
interests, and one requiring them to do so. See in particular the controversy over
Sarbanes-Oxley's permissive rather than mandatory approach to lawyers'
responsibilities in the reporting of managerial misconduct. See STEPHEN GlllERS,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS 37-38 (2009).
189 See EASTERBROOK &: FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 38; cf. Matthew 6:24 (The New
American Bible) ("No one can serve two masters. He will either hate one and love the
other, or be devoted to one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and
mammon.").
190 See Chen &: Hanson, supra note 27, at I l l -2 l . Greenfield calls the dominant
paradigm's arguments against the plausibility of multifiduciarism the "Emperor's New
Clothes" of corporate law scholarship. Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate
Law, 1 HASTINGS Bus. LJ 89, 104 (2005) . But cf. Mark Roe, German Securities Markets
and German Codetermination, 1998 COlUM. Bus. L REV. 1 67 (arguing that
codetermination weakens efficacy of German corporate boards).
19 1
Chen &: Hanson, supra note 27, at 1 1 1 .
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by the cogency of team production theory's insights that directors
must always already engage in the constant balancing of sometimes
synergistic and sometimes competing interests. 192
But progressive corporate law scholars have struggled to describe a
mechanism through which multiple-stakeholder fidUciary obligations
could be enforced. 1 93 Indeed, as indicated in the quote from Adolf
Berle at the start of Part Ill , shareholder primacists have long regarded
the problem of "unenforceability" as a fatal flaw in the multifiduciary
approach. 1 94 Nonetheless, I believe that a multifiduciary regime could
be institutionalized through modest expansions of the same basic
mechanisms presently in place to vindicate the fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care presently owed to shareholders by corporate boards.
For starters, consumer interests could be represented on the board
through either a "classified" or an "unclassified" directorial regime .
" Classified" directors would be individually assigned to represent
specific stakeholders, with one director representing consumers,
another representing stakeholders, one for workers, etc. 195 In an

1 92

See supra text accompanying notes 137-47.
See DeBow &: Lee, supra note 37, at 419 ("Nonshareholder constituency claims
would regularly be in conflict with one another and, in principle, would be
inexhaustible. We can foresee no principled way for our hypothetical enforcement
agency, or the courts, to develop predictable rules for determining 'who gets what'
under this sort of regulatory regime.").
1 94 See supra text accompanying note 141.
1 95 References to such classification schemes are few and far between in corporate
scholarship. In 1950, Beardsley Ruml, former chairperson of the Federal Reserve Bank
and intellectual architect of the "withholding" program in federal income taxation,
suggested "one modest step" of asking one director, nominated by the board and
elected in the normal manner by shareholders, to act as "trustee" for a stakeholder
group, including in Ruml's treatment, consumers. See Beardsley Ruml, Corporate
Managers as a Locus of Power, in SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS NO. 3 : THE
POWERS AND DUTIES OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 219, 235 ( 1950). Ruml suggested that
"these 'director-trustees' would sit, not as 'representatives' of the interest for which
they speak, but as designees of their fellow directors to give particular attention to
their trustee assignments." ld. at 236. In their call for federal chartering of publicly
traded corporations, Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman called for the
government appOintment of a certain number of directors on corporate boards, who
would give voice in corporate decision making to various dimensions of the public
interest. See RALPH NADER ET AL. , TAMING THE GtANT CORPORATION 75-132 ( 1976); see
also Michael Shanks, The Consumer as Stakeholder and the Implication for Consumer
Obligations, 6 J CONSUMER POL'y 133, 133 (1983) . Shanks's brief essay is one of the
only published works that endeavors to directly address the consumer as stakeholder
in the corporation. Writing within a European context (addresSing Denmark and the
UK in particular), Shanks provides a useful if not theoretically or programmatically
elaborate account of the difficulties with various noncorporate approaches to
attending to the consumer interest. ld. ; see also ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE
1 93
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" unclassified" system every director would represent all stakeholder
interests in a fiduciary fashion. 196 The extant structure and mechanics
of board composition would probably be least disturbed by the latter
unclassified approach. This approach would also provide directors the
broad latitude they need to attend flexibly to each group's interests in
the course of ongoing corporate decisions in dynamic market
environments.
With respect to the duty of loyalty, consumers, as corporate
stakeholders, have the same interests in preventing directorial
misappropriation of corporate assets as do shareholders. When
directors steal corporate value for themselves , they take not only from
what would otherwise go to shareholders, but also from what would
otherwise be shared among shareholders, workers , and consumers, in
the form of dividends, wages , prices, operational restraint and
corporate giving. Empowering consumers to sue corporate directors
for loyalty violations provides another set of eyes on the corporate till.
Thus, shareholders and workers, in addition to consumers, would
benefit from the availability of such consumer driven suits.
As for the duty of care, multifiduciary directors, like unifiduciary
directors, would be required to give the same level of care in their
management of the corporation as a person of ordinary prudence
would give to the management of their own affairs. 197 Corporate law
presently circumscribes enforcement of the duty of care with the
business j udgment rule. Under this rule, j udicial review of the quality
of directorial deCiSion-making is limited to examination of the
adequacy of the process by which the directors became informed and
deliberated on the decision. This juristic restraint is essential to
maintaining the leeway directors need to balance and manage the
intersection of multiple corporate stakeholders. 1 9B The expansion of
fiduciary obligation need not work an abandonment of this
fundamentally deferential framework. 1 99 N onetheless , it would expand

REVOLUTION 1 23 ( 1970); Abram Chayes, The Modem Corporation and the Rule of Law,
in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 40-41 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1966) .
196 See GREENFIELD, supra note 32, at 1 46-52.
197 See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. , 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1 963) (stating
that "directors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that
amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar
circumstances").
198 See supra text accompanying notes 13-16 (explicating nexus-of-contracts theory
of firm).
199 See Ratner, supra note 185, at 48 (exploring multifiduciary framework and
noting that substantive tradeoffs between constituencies could not give rise to cause of
action for delinquency, " [hl owever, it would be appropriate to hold management
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to consumers the right to have their concerns known to directors and
deliberated on by them. Courts are not fit to evaluate the substance of
decisions, but "they appear quite capable of detecting process flaws
,
that lead to substantively problematic results. , 200 Violations of these
expanded fiduciary obligations, or sham proceedings brought only to
cosmetically satisfy the requirements, would subject directors to
liability in care suits brought by consumers.
The specifics of how directors would manage their fiduciary
obligations to consumers would vary with every industry and in every
firm. However, if the corporation owes fiduciary obligations to
multiple constituencies, then it must at least be the case that managers
cannot advance the interests of one group of stakeholders by
manipulating another group. Put differently:
Joint adventurers . . . owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. 201
The corporate enterprise is composed of multiple "adventurers,"
among them shareholders and consumers.202 Extending a fiduciary
obligation to consumers would mean that as agents of both principles,
directors would be forbidden from advantaging shareholders by
exploiting consumers.203 In practice, a multifiduciary regime might

liable where it utterly failed to consider the interests of one of its constituencies or
otherwise dealt unfairly with them"). As Ratner points out, this is essentially the
standard presently employed where directors must balance the interests of cofiduciary
obligations owed to shareholders of different classes of stock. Id. at 48 n.l72.
200 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 868 n.49.
20 1
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N .E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) . Meinhard and Salmon had
been partners in a real estate development project; under a twenty-year lease, they
improved and operated the Hotel Bristol in New York City. Meinhard had put up the
capital and Salmon used his know-how and sweat to make it work. After nineteen
years and eight months, Salmon entered into an agreement with the landowner, on his
own, for a new lease lasting up to eighty years and contemplating major new
developments on the land. When Meinhard got wind of the deal, he claimed Salmon
had violated his fiduciary obligations to their partnership in seizing the opportunity
for himself. Cardozo agreed. Id. at 472.
202
See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
203 la
wrence Mitchell proposed a system for enforcing multifiduciary obligations
that would mirror a framework presently used to vindicate the interests of minority
stakeholders in closely held corporations. Stakeholders would have the right to
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mean for consumers little more than greater transparency and access
to corporate information, a right to good faith, fair dealing, and full
disclosure in all corporate dealings of the quality to which
shareholders are presently entitled.204
Certainly, fiduciary duty claims offer only limited protection even
for shareholders given the wide latitude that directors enjoy under the
business judgment rule.20s However, the process obligations
challenge corporate decisions they believed advanced the interests of some other
stakeholder at the expense of their own interests. The board would then be required to
show that their decision was in the best interest of the "corporation" as a whole, after
which the matter would be ' concluded unless the challenging stakeholder could
demonstrate that the same corporate purpose could have been accomplished in a
manner less harmful to their interest. See Mitchell, supra note 150, at 634-37. Again,
Mitchell has in mind a fiduciary protection for workers, but such an approach might
usefully be applied to protect the consumer interest. Id. There may indeed be business
arrangements that would benefit other stakeholders just as well and make consumers
better off, but which are not pursued under a strict shareholder primacy regime. But
this test is difficult enough to administer, as it puts courts in the position of evaluating
the substantive merits of directorial decisions, a task that corporate law generally
accepts courts are ill-equipped to manage. My approach instead favors process
obligations on behalf of multiple stakeholders, which courts are more capable of
monitoring.
204 I contend that this standard of care cannot be accomplished by rooting the
standard in collateral regulatory institutions rather than in firm governance.
Practically, the public choice problem engendered by shareholder primacy precludes
the establishment or maintenance of such regimes. Even if this were not a problem,
however, the fiduciary standard can only be implemented in firm governance because
it is in its essence about process and deliberation; it is not imposing an external rule or
standard, it is establishing an internal governance procedure that continually evolves
over the life of the corporation's relationship with its consumers. To establish such a
standard in a regulatory agency or in common law courts would simply be to install
those institutions as firm directors. They could no more accomplish the task than can
courts or administrative agencies make substantive business decisions on behalf of
shareholders.
205
Both nexus of contract shareholder primacists and their progressive critics are
more or less nonplused by the inefficacy of enforcing traditional fiduciary duties
through shareholder derivative suits, but for contradictory reasons. The former are
unworried because they believe in the power of the market, the latter are unworried
because they doubt that power. Nexus of contract theorists rely on the efficiency of
markets, specifically the market for control, to diSCipline directors, who are threatened
with losing their posts unless they are competitive. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 13, at 13 ("The history of corporations has been that firms failing to adapt their
governance structures are ground under by competition. "). Progressive corporate
scholars, on the other hand, take the weakness of fiduciary obligation as evidence for
the latitude that directors must and do have to manage the firm on behalf of all
stakeholders. But both perspectives recognize that at some level managers as a class
are able to slack across the market as they "satisfice" (rather than maximize)
shareholder interests, giving sufficient return on investment as to keep investors from
exiting or pursuing managerial change, but not maximizing firm value either. See
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impounded into the duty of care may have a substantive impact on the
consumer interest. Pointing to social psychological literature on the
operation of "fairness" concerns in human decision-making, Kent
Greenfield has recently argued that group decisions are more likely to
be substantively fair when fairness concerns are explicitly
communicated during group deliberation. 206 Articulating and listening
to the concerns of numerous perspectives also promotes the formation
of a group identity among participants to the conversation. When
individuals believe their decisions will affect a group with which they
associate themselves, they tend to make distributionally eqUitable
decisions.207 Further, social psychologists have noted the ease with
which even arbitrarily designating individuals as members of a
specified group can induced group-serving motivations within
individuals assigned to the group, even where shared interests other
than the fact of group designation are absent.20s In scholarship
exploring the plausibility of fiduciary protections in firm governance
for workers, progressive corporate law scholars have also argued that
the entire corporation, and by extension society generally, stands to
benefit from the efficiencies gained from the cooperative reciprocation
that is unleashed under the multifiduciary regime. 209
Of course, the multifiduciary prescription does not advocate a
complete abandonment of the profit-principle in corporate theory or
law. The corporation must benefit all its stakeholders; for
shareholders, this means making profits. The pursuit of residual
profits for shareholders will thus remain the basic orientation and
measuring stick of firm performance. Though profits are not a
sufficient indicator of the social utility of the firm, they are a necessary
component of it. The important question from a social policy
perspective is not how to ensure shareholders maximum profits , but

Elhauge, supra note 1 29, at 804. In both approaches the lax duty of care standard
yields to a strict duty of loyalty standard, which aggressively polices severe mulcting
of the firm by its directorate.
206
GREENFIELD, supra note 32, at 1 75-78.
207
See id. at 1 75-79.
208
See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 32, at 94- 1 1 5
(describing group preference dynamics).
209
See GREENFIELD, supra note 32, at 162 ("Employees' pOSitive beliefs about the
fairness of the firm provide appreciable benefits to the firm by decreasing the need to
monitor employee behavior."); see also Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era:
Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Co-Operation, 78
CORNELL. L Rev. 899 (1993) (arguing that greater investments in the well-being of
workers will make firms more productive and socially useful).
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how to provide them sufficient profits in order to induce investment
in the sOcially useful work of the firm.
2.

Stakeholder Democracy

A further way to make corporate governance more responsive to
consumer interests would be to enable consumer participation in the
election of firm directors. All of a corporation's stakeholders have an
interest in its successful operation. However, some stakeholders'
interests collectively are more consistently aligned than others'. For
example, shareholders and workers may at times have interests that
are more closely aligned with each other's interests than they are with
those of consumers; indeed, shareholders and workers may collude
against consumers. Although shareholders, managers and consumers
all benefit from "efficiency and economy in management," only
shareholders and managers benefit from high prices.210 This
misalignment is likely to emerge even in a multifiduciary regime, so
long as only shareholders, or shareholders and workers , are electing
directors. In some markets, consumers might benefit from
representation not only at the cash register, but also in the boardroom.
As Gardiner Means noted, the proper "allocation of resources through
corporate enterprise is both a matter of efficiency in production and
importantly a matter of what is produced. A consumer veto over
wasteful use of resources after the use has been made is by no means
the same as consumer control over the issue. " 2 1 1
Few corporate scholars have considered the possibility of involving
consumers in firm governance by expanding the franchise to them;
fewer still have endorsed the idea. Even progressive commentators
have concluded that " [ i J n contrast to employees and customers [i.e.,
businesses that buy from other businesses] , ultimate consumers . . .

210
Alfred F. Conrad, Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 94 1 ,
952 ( 1977); see also Chayes, supra note 195, a t 43 (" [TJhe growth o f strong unions
has [ notl been free of problems. It may be said that the bargain can too easily become
an agreement to pursue joint ends at the expense of unrepresented parties. Such
'collusion' has been said to characterize wage negotiations in the 'administered price'
industries."); Ratner, supra note 185, at 35-36 ("Under current labor laws, there is a
good deal of bona fide arm's-length bargaining between management and labor
representatives over real questions of allocation of economic benefits and decision
making power within the corporate organization . . . . [lIt is quite possible, and indeed
common, for the negotiations to result in an agreement that satisfies both employees
and management at the expense of consumers or other unrepresented economic or
social interest groups.").
2ll
Means, supra note 125, at 82.
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seem [ l to be inherently unsuitable as electorates. " 212 In his touchstone
article on corporate governance, business scholar Oliver Williamson
provides a representative summary of reasons for rejecting the idea.
With respect to consumers' corporate dealings, as usual, " [ T1 he main
protection . . . is generally the option to take their trade elsewhere. " 2 1 3
Williamson acknowledges, however, that consumer markets
sometimes fail; for example, " [pl roducts that have delayed health
effects are an exception"214 to the reliability of market regulation . In
such circumstances, you guessed it, "A regulatory agency equipped to
receive complaints and screen products for health hazards could serve
to infuse confidence."2 1 5 Whatever the inadequacies of the market and
external regulation, " [m1 embership on the board of directors is not . . .
clearly indicated" as a solution.2 1 6 Williamson asks:
Who are representative consumers? How do they communicate
with their constituency? Token representation may create only
unwarranted confidence . . . . Further innovations to offer
consumer protection on a discriminating basis may be
needed . . . . [H1 owever, a general case for inclusion of
consumers on the board of directors is not compelling. 2 1 7

212

Conrad, supra note 2 10, at 956. Conrad continues: "Even the most outspoken
advocates of their interests - such as Nader and Stone - have refrained from
proposing that they be given a role in director selection." Id. Yet, Conrad notes that
the idea is not as illogical as it seems to have been taken to be, after all, " [b J oth
customers and employees have an interest in the long-term welfare of the enterprise
even greater than that of many shareholders, who can switch their loyalties as fast as
they can dial [sic] Merrill Lynch." Id. at 959-60. Chayes makes a similar point, noting
that shareholders may be a "misconceived" candidate for the franchise:
Of all those standing in relation to the large corporation, the shareholder is
least subject to its power. Through the mechanisms of the security markets,
his [or her J relation to the corporation is rendered highly abstract and
formal, quite limited in scope, and readily reducible to monetary terms. The
market affords him [or her) a way of breaking this relation that is simple and
effective . . . . Shareholder democracy, so-called, is misconceived because the
shareholders are not the governed of the corporation . . . . If they are, it is
only in the most limited sense.
Chayes, supra note 195, at 40.
2 13
Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE LJ. 1 197, 1213 ( 1984).
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id. at 1 2 13-14. Williamson's critique of consumer suffrage in the corporation
parallels Henry Hansmann's explanation for the very limited use of consumer
cooperatives in most retail markets. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF
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This Article has already analyzed the limitations of consumer
sovereignty and backstop regulatory institutions as exclusive
guardians of the consumer interest. Given these limitations, one might
consider whether there are viable answers to the rhetorical questions
Williamson poses. His suggestion that the problem of identifying
"representative consumers" to sit on the board stands in the way of
consumer participation in firm governance seems oddly to assume that
such a regime requires finding some genuine "Joe the Consumer" to
sit in representation of all other consumers. This is unnecessary;
consumers could elect professional representatives - directors - to
advance their interests in corporate governance, just as shareholders
now do. Perhaps the deeper sense of his question is the substantive
issue of what these directors would do to advance the interests of
consumers. But the question of what substantive decisions directors
should make is a question that corporate law rightfully evades, always
deferring to the good faith determination of the incumbent board.
Corporate law can only ensure that directors undertake procedures,
such as investigation, examination, and deliberation, in good faith.
Consumer representatives would be charged with doing good business
in the interests of consumers, just as directors are presently charged to
do so solely for shareholders.
With regard to the problem of "token representation," Williamson is
a fraid that a superficial form o f consumer representation might lull

ENTERPRISE 161-62 ( 1996) ( " [ C l onsumer cooperatives have an insignificant share of
the market for nearly all retail goods in the United States and, with a few exceptions,
in other developed nations as well."). For Hansmann, this is easily understood and is
not troubling:
[Tlhe costs of customer ownership for many retail goods and services are
high, because the customers of any given retail firm are commonly too
numerous, transitory, and dispersed to organize easily or effectively. The
costs of market contracting are commonly low: retail markets for most
ordinary items are sufficiently competitive to keep prices close to cost, and
the goods and services themselves are sufficiently simple or standardized, or
are purchased so repetitively, that asymmetric information about quality is
not a serious problem.
Id. Where contract fails, as always, the backstop is collateral regulation. Id. at 151 ("In
effect, regulation can be a substitute for customer ownership in protecting consumers
from market failure."). Pursuing the consumer interest through corporate governance,
by expanding fiduciary protections, corporate suffrage, and federal securities law
protection to consumers, may prOvide a useful middle course between inefficient
consumer co-operatives and exploitive markets backed by ineffective regulation. See
supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. The very dynamics that keep consumers
from forming consumer co-operatives keeps them from collectively acting in their
own interests in the legislative and regulatory arenas.
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consumers and regulators into a false confidence that consumer
interests are being monitored, leaving them vulnerable to continuing
efforts by firms to exploit consumers .2 1 8 Fearing that consumers will
be easily misled or betrayed by tokenism is somewhat incongruous,
given that the standard account (which Williamson is propounding) is
deeply committed to the view that consumers .are not easily misled and
are able to look to their own interests in the market. The problem of
tokenism may indeed be a real threat to consumers, but it is a problem
that can be overcome by making consumer suffrage and representation
genuine and robust. This would be accomplished either by giving
classified consumer directors a substantial number of seats on the
board, or, by requiring all directors, in an unclassified system, to
attend to consumer interests in firm governance. The "lulling" critique
of consumer representation at the board level also proves too much, as
the argument could also be used to suggest that directors should not
purport to represent shareholder interests, lest shareholders take
insufficient personal responsibility for evaluating the merits of firms in
which they might invest - an argument that proponents of the
standard approach never make.
The question of how consumer directors would " communicate with
their constituency" is a crucial practical issue, but it is not the
showstopper that Williamson and other critics have assumed it to be.
First, consumer-elected directors could communicate with consumers
in much the same way that directors presently communicate with their
shareholder constituents - through press releases and occasional
direct mailings. The ability of the firm to communicate with
consumers is already taken for granted in the shareholder primacy
norm. Corporate law assumes firms are capable of reaching their
consumers and communicating to them about the price and quality of
their goods. Corporations could harness the same mechanisms to
communicate with consumers regarding matters of corporate
governance. The more important communication issue that
Williamson seems to have in mind is the problem of identifying who
the firms' consumers are and figuring out how they could
communicate their votes to the corporation. Other commentators have
also fixated on the impracticality of consumer suffrage as a decisive
reason for not pursuing the idea. David Ratner wrote that the idea of
consumers voting was "absurd only because it is unworkable"2 1 9 and

218
219

See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
Ratner, supra note 185, at 33. In theory the notion made sense to him:

The purchasers of GE light bulbs, as a group, have a real and substantial
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closed his thought experiment on expanding the corporate franchise
based on that assumption, claiming " [ tlhe absence of workable
a lternatives forces us to return to the concept of the shareholders as
the electorate. " 220
These obj ections are logistical, not conceptual. And these scholars'
reckoning of the logistical limitations of consumer suffrage is dated. In
fact, many retail corporations h ave already put in place the rudiments
of a viable technological infrastructure for facilitating a consumer
suffrage regime. Today national retail firms maintain elaborate records
of what their consumers purchase and how their consumers can be
contacted. Firms track such information through "consumer loyalty"
p rograms that provide consumers with magnetized cards and
identifying numbers that consumers or retail clerks swipe at the
register, or type into an online interface, each time a consumer makes
a purchase. Consumers interested in participating in corporate
governance could be issued a voting identification number. Instead of
(or in addition to) consumers accumulating "points" or "miles"
redeemable for future discounts or prizes, consumers could with each
purchase accumulate votes, or fractions of votes, to be exercised at
regular intervals in corporate elections. Consumers not wishing to
participate in corporate democracy would simply not have their
purchases registered in the suffrage database, just as consumers for
p rivacy reasons or indifference presently avoid consumer loyalty
programs. Other technological advances, most crucially the Internet,
would allow interested consumers to easily keep abreast of corporate
governance issues and even become involved in active campaigning
with their fellow consumers for different pro-consumer slates of
directors. Consumers could cast their votes online as well. 221

interest in whether GE management incorporates known improvements in
the product. The problem is finding the most appropriate means by which
this interest can be taken into account in management decisions. To say that
the customers' only right is to buy the goods of a competing manufacturer is
akin to saying that a shareholder does not need a vote in a publicly-held
corporation because he [ or she] is fully protected by his [or her] right to sell
his [or her] shares on the market at any time.
Id.
220 Id. ; see also Conrad, supra note 210, at 959 (concluding that "obstacle[ ] for
which no solutions have been suggested" is "the difficulty of finding the consumers
and persuading them to concern themselves with their representation").
221 C
j. Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, SEC Release No. 34-52926, 70 Fed.
Reg. 74,598 (Dec. 15, 2005) (allowing online proxy voting) ; see also Richard H.
Grubaugh, Technological Advances in the Proxy System, 1405 PLVCORP 515, 518-19
Gan. 14, 2004) (providing overview of advances in online proxy solicitation and
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Eugene Rostow, a former dean of Yale Law School and
Undersecretary of State in Lyndon Johnson's administration, once
lampooned proponents of an expanded corporate franchise who
"would apparently hope to cure the present shortcomings of corporate
democracy in endocratic [i.e. , publicly held] corporations by adding
new groups of apathetic and disinterested voters to the masses of
stockholders who now fail to exercise their franchise intelligently. " m
However, b y working through contemporary communicative systems,
the expansion of corporate suffrage might yield some of the innovative
organizing advantages that have emerged in social, professional, and
3
political online collaboration sometimes referred to as "Web 2.0. " 22
Management need not fear harassment by the consumer electorate;
very likely, they can expect apathy except where directors persist in
anti-consumer conduct. 224
Many scholars have doubted that a broadly representative corporate
governance regime could realistically work. Alfred Conrad described a
representative corporate governance regime as the "dream" of
corporate law reformers but was sure that "to most executives, the
vision of a board of directors composed of advocates of competing
objectives would be a nightmare."m Blair and Stout solute the parade
of horribles: "Imagine the chaos and politicking likely to attend an
election in which a firm's creditors, executives, rank-and-file
employees , and other stakeholders with unique and often conflicting
voting) ; Blake Smith, Note, Proxy Access and the Internet Age: Using Electronic
Shareholder Forums to Improve Corporate Governance, 2008 COLUM . Bus. L. REV. l l l l ,
l l38 (2008).
222
Eugene Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management
Responsible, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 55-56 (Edward S. Mason ed.,
1966). Conrad argues that " [ tlhe prosperity of any particular manufacturer is of little
concern to [consumers 1 ; their 'customer loyalty' readily gives way to offer of a larger
rebate on a competing brand. The likelihood that their representatives will contribute
much to the j oint concerns of a multipurpose board of directors seems small."
Conrad, supra note 210, at 954-55. But the situation is no different for shareholders;
they want maximum profitability in the market, not in any one firm, and this they
pursue in part by urging directors to focus on shareholder interests in individual
companies. More importantly, the notion that the pursuit of consumer interests will
not always Simultaneously advance all other interests is precisely the reason why
consumer representation is necessary, rather than a justification for why it is
undesirable.
223 See
generally Christophe Aguiton &: Dominque Cardon, The Strength of Weak
Cooperation: An Attempt to Understand the Meaning of Web 2.0, 65 COMM . &: STRATEGIES
5 1 (2007) (examining co-operative possibilities in Web 2.0 that allow innovative ways
to overcome traditional collective action problems).
224 See Ratner, supra note 185, at 47.
m Conrad, supra note 2 10, at 947, 950.
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interests could vote on their favored candidates . " 226 Beardsley Ruml,
who entertained the idea of select directors serving as "trustees" for
nonshareholding stakeholders, thought that the idea of direct
representation of multiple stakeholders on the corporate board would
be a " travesty" that "would result in business political gangsterism that
would destroy the efficiency of business management. It would inject
into circles requiring the most intimate confidence individuals whose
reliability was uncertain and whose motives and ambitions would be
,,
in doubt. 2 27
There is an important irony or incoherence in this oft-heard claim
among apologists for shareholder exclUSivity in corporate governance
that " [r 1 eplicating governmental and political structures and processes
within the business world would produce the same sort of interest
group politics and incentive and information problems that plague
,,
government action. 228 Such a claim gives the lie to the proposition,
also central to the dominant view, that collateral governmental
institutions can be relied upon to look after the interests of
nonshareholding constituents when markets fail.229
In any event, this "gangsterism" problem, if there is one, would be
most persistent under a classified system in which distinct "consumer"
directors were elected by and represented only consumers on a board
comprised also of representatives of other stakeholders. Other
approaches, however, could ensure more peaceful, collaborative
governance, while still giving distinct voice to different stakeholders in
board formation. For example, consumers could vote along with other

226

Blair &: Stout, supra note 140, at 3 13.
Id. at 234. But cJ. Robert Dahl, Power to the Workers ?, 15 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
Nov. 19, 1970, at 9 ( " [ l I n addition to workers, others whose interests would be
affected by the decisions of an enterprise might be given the right to participate in
decisions - to have a direct say in management, for example, through representatives
on the board of directors of the firm. Thus the board of directors might consist of one
third representatives elected by employees, one-third consumer representatives, and
one-third delegates of federal, state, and local governments.") . Dahl unfortunately did
not develop this idea of consumer representation further in any of his numerous
writings.
228
Debow &: Lee, supra note 37, at 404.
229
The feasibility of code termination regimes is also evidenced by corporate
governance structures in Europe and Asia, which have to some extent involved
worker representatives in firm governance. See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of
Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Styles, 29 DEL. ]. CORP. L. 649,
735 (2004) ("Employee participation in the supervisory organ is . . . mandated (with
qualifications) in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
Sweden. In France, Ireland, Portugal, and other EU Member States, the law includes
aspects of employee participation in corporate governance. ").
227
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stakeholders on unclassified slates of directors who would then represent
all stakeholder interests. Or a third compromise approach would be for
consumers to elect a classified set of directors who would then have
fiduciary duties to the corporation and all its stakeholders, just as
directors elected by other stakeholders would owe duties to consumers
and to the group that elected them. However they are elected, board
members become the agents representing the interests of the different
stakeholders who put them in office, and embody in their discursive
practices on the board the kind of fellowship needed to activate
cooperative reciprocation, from which all stakeholders benefit. 230
Proponents of shareholder primacy have also sometimes scoffed at
the idea that multifiduciarism and codetermination can add value for
all stakeholders , including shareholders , claiming that if this were true
then profit-maximizing firms operating in competitive markets would
already have developed such institutional arrangements. 23 1 Legal
economists would likely cast the same doubt on the potential of
consumer contribution to sound firm governance.232 The Panglossian
style in corporate theory cannot be falsified, but neither can it be
believed. Corporate law is replete with examples of central
mechanisms that have not spontaneously arrived or evolved out of
corporate practice. The federal securities regulation apparatus and
state courts adjudicating corporate disputes are j ust two of them.
Finally, recall that under the nexus of contract regime corporate law
must provide the shareholder primacy norm as background law
because corporate stakeholders find it very burdensome to actually

2 30 Proponents of shareholder primacy have belittled progressive corporate law
scholars' use of the reciprocal cooperation insight, arguing that it has no application in
corporate interactions, given that shareholders, workers, directors, and consumers all
have non-intimate, arms length associations with each other. Bainbridge argues that
the "notions of trust and mutual interdependence" stressed by progressive corporation
law scholars is "almost wholly unrecognizable" in large markets in which "individuals
increasingly hold widely diversified portfolios" and for whom "corporate stock
evidences not a relationship of trust and mutual interdependence . . . . " Bainbridge,
supra note 13, at 875-76. These scholars seem not to recognize the importance of
directors embodying the different stakeholders through their performance of board
duties, which requires the examination of and deliberation on the interests of the
various stakeholders. These directors are assigned the role and have a constituency to
whom they are in principle and, through the electoral mechanism, accountable to. See
supra note 189 and accompanying text (referencing social psychological findings
regarding ease with which group identification and concomitant decision-making
dynamics can be created).
231 Williamson, supra note 213, at 1 209 &1 n.4l.
m Id.
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negotiate their arrangements with specificity. 233 Corporate law is
already committed to the view that it is difficult for stakeholders to
privately order in the most desirable fashion. Opting out of default
regimes is often just as difficult as specifying a regime where no
defaults are provided . Given social scientific insights regarding
psychological dynamics such as the endowment effect and the status
quo bias, contracting out of the default regime provided by positive
corporate law may be even more difficult than is assumed in the
standard account.234
There are numerous ways to apportion voting powers among
consumers. For example, one could track the basic "one share, one
vote" approach found in conventional corporate governance, which
usually apportions voting power relative to shareholders' equity in the
firm. Such a system would allot consumer votes in proportion to the
dollar amount the consumer spends on the corporate product. This is
p robably the most sensible approach. Proportional suffrage, however,
is not the only available corporate voting system. According to David
Ratner, the "one share , one vote" paradigm in corporate governance is
of relatively recent vintage.235 The one share, one vote paradigm, he
argues, "is inherently no more logical than making voting rights in
school district elections proportional to the school taxes paid by the
voters or the numbers of their children enrolled in the school
system. ,, 236 Ratner looks for guidance in the contours of the "one
person, one vote" principle in the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence. The Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes a one person, one vote rule wherever elections bear on the
appointment of representatives charged with governance that is of
general public interest. For example, the rule applies not only in the
election of state governments, but also in the election of school boards
or utility boards. 237 Extending this thinking to the corporation, Ratner
argues that when a firm "makes a public offering of its securities," it
"presumes to perform a public function," and should therefore be
233 See supra notes 1 75-83 and accompanying text.
234 See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 32, at 39-42.
2 35 See Ratner, supra note 1 85, at 9 ( [Tlhe emergence of a general rule of one vote
per share did not result from enlightened awareness of the inadequacies of an
inappropriate common law rule, but was the nineteenth-century culmination of a 300year political controversy over the degree and type of control that should be retained
over the managers of corporations chartered for economic purposes."); see also
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1 77, at 450 (describing one-share, one vote as "the modem
standard, but . . . not the sole historical pattern").
2 3 6 Ratner, supra note 1 85, at 19.
2 37 See id. at 38-44.
"
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subject to a one constituent, one vote rule.D8 Applying Ratner's
analysis to consumer suffrage , one might give all consumers of a firm's
products the right to one vote in a given election cycle. In certain
markets , it might be useful for all consumers to have an equal voice in
corporate governance.

C.

Protecting the Consumer Interest with the Federal Securities Laws

The federal securities laws supplement state-based common law and
statutory tools available to shareholders for disciplining directors and
otherwise influencing firm governance. These federal devices could be
extended in the consumer interest. For example, one plaUSible idea
would be to allow consumers to vote on social issue proposals made
by shareholders under Rule 14 of the Securities Exchange Act. 239
Consumers certainly have as much interest in the subject matter of
social issue proposals as do shareholders, and sometimes more.
Consider, for example, the famous case of Lovenheim v. Iroquois
Brands, Ltd. , in which Lovenheim, a shareholder, sought to include a
proposal in Iroquois' proxy materials that would require the firm to
review its use of the gruesome practice of force-feeding geese in the
production of pate. 240 According to the proposal:
Force-feeding usually begins when the geese are four months
old. On some farms where feeding is mechanized, the bird's
body and wings are placed in a metal brace and its neck is
stretched. Through a funnel inserted 1 0- 1 2 inches down the
throat of the goose, a machine pumps up to 400 grams of
corn-based mash into its stomach. An elastic band around the
goose's throat prevents regurgitation. When feeding is manual,
a handler uses a funnel and stick to force the mash down.241
Shareholders might author this proposal because they are worried
about the reputational effects of such practices on the value of the
firm, or out of concern for the ethics and morality of the practice.
Consumers also have both concerns. If they enj oy Iroquois pate or
other Iroquois products, they might fear that the reputational

238 Id. at 43.
239 See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-8 (2005); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 177, at 495505 (adumbrating law of shareholder proposals); supra notes 168- 181 and
accompanying text (discussing limited power of shareholder proposals to protect
consumer interests).
240 Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.C. 1985) .
241 Id. at 556 n.2.
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consequences of the practice will undermine the firm's long-term
profitability, resulting in product discontinuation or higher prices.
Consumers also might be concerned about the morality and ethics of
the production methods used in the pate. Indeed, here the consumer
interest might be regarded as more intense than shareholder concerns,
as it is consumers who actually ingest into their own bodies products
forged through such abusive conduct.
A more advanced reform would allow consumers to author
proposals and submit them to the shareholders , or further still, to all
of the voting stakeholders in the firm, including consumers. The Rule
1 4 mechanism would allow consumers to address broad issues that
may be implicated in the firm's operation but which are nevertheless
not salient at the point of the consumptive act, such as the long-term
consequences of consumption, or the social consequences of
consumption.242 With Rule 14, the SEC deciSively takes the position
that the threat of exit is an insufficient mechanism for the expression
of nonpecuniary, or even profit-sacrifiCing, interests of shareholders. 243
Similarly, allowing consumers to vote on shareholder proposals might
provide them a more potent mechanism for influencing corporate
conduct than is available to them in the market alone. Access to such a
mechanism might help consumers to overcome collective action
problems. 244 As described above, a consumer may prefer that a product
be made in a more SOcially respo nsible fashion, but may doubt that her
singular refusal to purchase the product will have any influence.
Because everyone makes this calculation, nobody forebears from
consumption. A vote on such matters would allow consumers to have
their cake (or pate) and eat it too , at least until such a time when they
can convince the corporation to make the product with healthier or
more ethical ingredients.
CONCLUSION
In some markets, consumers are vulnerable to manipulation and
exploitation in ways that the dominant corporate law paradigm fails to
anticipate, recognize, or cure. In such markets, where contract is
inadequate and government regulation, due to public choice problems
that shareholder primacy in corporate governance helps to create, is
u nreliable, the social purpose of corporate enterprise might be advanced

242 See § 240.14a-8.
243 Id.
244 See supra notes 1 27- 134 and accompanying text (discussing consumer
collective action problems) .
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by attending to consumer interests a t the level o f firm governance.
Merely giving authority to corporate directors to attend to consumer
interests is probably inadequate. Indeed, increasing managerial
discretion might only exacerbate the problem of managerial slack and
give directors little incentive to look beyond traditional shareholder
interests. Instead, directors must be obliged to comport themselves as
fiduciaries to their consumers, an obligation which consumers could
enforce through the same mechanisms presently available to
shareholders, including lawsuits for loyalty and care violations.
Consumers might also be integrated into corporate democracy, electing
specific representatives to the board or participating in the election of
general directors who will serve the interests of all corporate
stakeholders. Finally, consumers might participate in corporate
governance mechanisms presently provided to shareholders through the
federal securities laws, including the proposal mechanism.
These kinds of innovations, while explored here only in broad
conceptual outline, could be implemented through overlapping
developments in legislation and judicial interpretation of existing
corporate law. 245 Corporate law always exists in the context of the
state's reservation of the prerogative of alteration.246 The institutional
experimentation discussed here is not offered as a blanket prescription
applicable to all publicly traded corporations, but is rather the
exploration of one kind of institutional arrangement that might
usefully be deployed in situations where consumers are particularly
vulnerable to shareholder primacy in corporate governance. It is, most
importantly, an exploration of how corporate law might provide the
solution to what is at heart a corporate law problem. This analysis
shares with proponents of the dominant corporate law paradigm both
a deep skepticism about the feasibility of government regulation alone
as a response to social problems, and an abiding faith in the power of
the corporation as a mechanism of social organization.

245 See O'Connor, supra note 1 79, at 106 ("In creating new fiduciary rights . . .
courts do not look to the legislature for permission. Courts have a long history of
judicial activism in creating fiduciary duties in business settings, such as shareholders'
fiduciary duties in close corporations and majority shareholders fiduciary duties to
minority shareholders. This process of creating new fiduciary duties is necessary to
allow judges to formulate standards over time through an evolutionary process not
available to legislatures.").
246
See Elhauge, supra note 1 29, at 788 n. 134 (citing Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 ( 1986)) (" [Tlypically the degree of
reliance parties place on any status quo will be more efficient if the relying parties bear
the risk that the status quo might change. ").
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